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I.  Introduction 
 
 On August 22, 2002, Ariel Castro kidnapped Michelle Knight.
1
  
For 11 years, he imprisoned Michelle at his house, tortured her, raped 
her, impregnated her several times, and brutally forced her to miscarry.
2
  
 On May 6, 2013, Michelle and her two fellow victims, Georgina 
“Gina” DeJesus and Amanda Berry, finally managed to escape.3   
 On July 26, 2013, Castro pled guilty to 937 counts of rape, 
kidnapping, and aggravated murder in order to avoid the death penalty.
4
   
 On August 1, 2013, just before Judge Michael Russo sentenced 
Castro to life in prison without parole plus 1000 years, the three victims 
were permitted to give victim-impact statements.
5
  Here is what Michelle 
Knight said (in part): 
 
. . . You took 11 years from my life, but I've got my life back! 
 
I spent 11 years in hell.  Now your hell is just beginning.  I will 
overcome all that happened, but you're going to face hell for 
eternity!  From this moment on, I am NOT going to let you 
define me or affect who I am.  I will live on but you will die a 
little more inside each day as you think of those 11 years and 
the atrocities you inflicted on us.  What does God think of you 
hypocritically going to church each Sunday and then coming 
home to torture us?  The death penalty would be the easy way 
out; you don't deserve that!  We want you to spend the rest of 
your life in prison! . . .
6
 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
1
 See Erin Donaghue, Michelle Knight, Cleveland kidnapping victim, to Ariel 
Castro: "Your hell is just beginning", Aug. 1, 2013, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/michelle-knight-cleveland-kidnapping-victim-
to-ariel-castro-your-hell-is-just-beginning/. 
2
 Id. 
3
 See Michael Muskal, Ariel Castro gets life, no parole; victim says his hell 
awaits, Aug. 1, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/news/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-
ariel-castro-michelle-knight-20130801,0,2844274.story#axzz2r2LCAkQc.   
4
 See Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Ariel Castro pleads guilty to 937 counts in Ohio 
kidnapping case, July 26, 2013, 
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/headlines/20130726-ariel-castro-
pleads-guilty-to-937-counts-in-ohio-kidnapping-case.ece.   
5
 See Donaghue, supra note 1. 
6
See Statements on behalf of Amanda Berry, Gina DeJesus and Michelle Knight, 
Aug. 1, 2013, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/statements-on-behalf-
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 Vengeful words indeed. To see just how vengeful they are, 
imagine that the governor of a northeastern state who had presidential 
ambitions emailed the following similar statements to a defiant mayor: 
 
Now your hell is just beginning.  I will overcome your slight, 
but you're going to face hell for eternity!  From this moment 
on, I am NOT going to let you win.  I will live on but you will 
die a little more inside each day as you think of your insolence.  
 
Imagine also that the mayor then leaked this email to the media.  What 
would happen to the governor?  Almost everybody would roundly 
condemn him, and his political life – certainly his presidential ambitions 
– would die a swift death.  This kind of vengeful language is simply 
unacceptable from a governor. 
 But if it is unacceptable from a governor, shouldn’t it be 
unacceptable from any individual?  Shouldn’t we equally condemn 
Michelle Knight?  After all, Nelson Mandela was imprisoned for 16 
more years than Michelle and never said anything nearly as vengeful 
about his racist captors.
7
  Why couldn’t Michelle Knight have risen to the 
same heights as Mandela? Shouldn’t we denounce her for saying such 
hateful things to her captor?
8
   
                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
of-amanda-berry-gina-dejesus-and-michelle-knight-217977801.html. 
7
 See Barbara Mutch, Mandela taught the power of forgiveness: Column, Dec. 8, 
2013,  
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/12/08/nelson-mandela-remember-
column/3896245/; Justice Malala, 'Mandela looked his enemy in the eye and 
held him close', Dec. 7, 2013, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/nelson-
mandela/10501060/Mandela-looked-his-enemy-in-the-eye-and-held-him-
close.html.   
8
 Opponents of victim-impact statements offer two main arguments.  First, they 
argue that victim-impact statements debase the criminal justice system by 
permitting, if not encouraging, victims and their families not to forgive but to do 
the very opposite – express their ugliest, most vengeful sentiments.  Indeed, for 
this reason, victim-impact statements have been derogatorily characterized as 
“institutionalized revenge.”  See Catherine Guastello, Victim Impact Statements: 
Institutionalized Revenge, 37 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1321 (2005); see also Michael Price, 
Revenge and the People Who Seek It:  New Research Offers Insight into the 
Dish Best Served Cold, THE MONITOR, June 2009, 
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/06/revenge.aspx (“Victim impact statements . 
. . can partially satisfy a victim's vengeful feelings while also putting the 
responsibility for punishment on the state . . .”); Brian Rosebury, Private 
Revenge and its Relation to Punishment, 21 UTILITAS 1, 11 (2009) (“[A] 
suspicion of [revenge’s] presence hangs over some recent developments in 
criminal justice doctrines.  One example is the introduction of ‘victim impact 
statements’ in some jurisdictions.”) (citations omitted).  Second, opponents of 
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 While a very small number of people might answer this last 
question in the affirmative, most would not.  Instead, they would insist 
that Michelle was perfectly justified in saying and thinking what she did, 
that she had every right to wish eternal suffering on the man who had 
cruelly and callously inflicted such suffering on her for his own pleasure.  
So counterbalancing our tendency to condemn vengeance in the abstract 
is our tendency to adopt the very opposite position when we learn of the 
particular circumstances that justify it.
9
  The task of this paper is to show 
that harmful criminal wrongdoing is just such a circumstance and 
therefore that, contrary to popular wisdom, vengeance plays a legitimate 
and central role in the criminal justice system. 
 The theory of retributivism is sometimes thought to capture this 
point of view.  But this perception is not quite right.  The relationship 
between retributivism and revenge is much more complicated, as I hope 
to show.  Retributivism is the theory that (a) we punish criminals in order 
to give them what they deserve (b) because this result is inherently good, 
                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
victim-impact statements argue that they are unfair to defendants. While these 
statements bear no relevance to defendants’ blameworthiness, they play on 
judges’ and juries’ emotions and thereby manipulate them into increasing 
defendants’ sentences.  See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 860-61 (1991) (J. 
Stevens dissenting) (“[A]spects of the character of the victim unforeseeable to 
the defendant at the time of his crime are irrelevant the defendant's ‘personal 
responsibility and moral guilt’ and therefore cannot justify a death sentence.”) 
(citations omitted); Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony 
and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 421-22 (2003) 
(“[C]ommentators are particularly concerned that victim impact statements 
highlight the perceived relative worth of the victim, and consequently that the 
jury's judgment about whether to impose the death sentence will be influenced 
by this inappropriate factor. . . . [T]he death reflects neither the murderer's 
mental state nor the morality of the act itself.  In addition, victim impact 
statements detail the various harms that befall the victim or the victim's family 
after a crime . . . that a defendant might not have been able to foresee at the time 
of the crime.”) (citations omitted).  This criticism of victim-impact statements is 
part of a more general debate about whether the harm a person causes should be 
factored into her blame or punishment because it was a matter of “outcome 
luck” – something outside her control and therefore something that arguably 
should not affect her desert.  For two opposing views, see Bebhinn Donnelly, 
Sentencing and Consequences: A Divergence Between Blameworthiness and 
Liability to Punishment, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 392 (2007); and Ken Levy, The 
Solution to the Problem of Outcome Luck: Why Harm Is Just as Punishable as 
the Wrongful Action That Causes It, 24 L. & PHIL. 263 (2005).   
9
 Cf. Anders Kaye, Powerful Particulars:  The Real Reason the Behavioral 
Sciences Threaten Criminal Responsibility, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 539 passim 
(2010) (arguing that particular details about an individual’s psychology and past 
victimhood tend to motivate sympathy more effectively than abstract theories 
about determinism and responsibility). 
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an end that is justified in itself.
10
  Retributivism is usually contrasted with 
consequentialism, which suggests that we punish criminals in order to 
bring about a good result beyond, or instead of, merely giving criminals 
their just deserts:  protecting society against more crimes by 
incapacitating them (through incarceration or, in rare cases, death); 
discouraging them from repeating the same kinds of crimes after release 
(specific deterrence and possibly rehabilitation); and discouraging others 
in society from committing similar crimes  (general deterrence).
11
 
 There is also a third theory – expressivism – which suggests that 
we punish criminals in order to express our moral disapproval of their 
criminal behavior.  Punishment is the best, if not the only, “language” 
through which we may blame individuals for violating the criminal law, 
communicate the gravity of the criminals’ wrongdoing to offenders, and 
thereby affirm the moral and criminal-legal norms of the community.
12
  
                                                     
 
 
 
 
10
 See DAVID BOONIN, THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHMENT 87 (2008); MICHAEL 
MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 87-88, 
111 (1997); David Dolinko, Punishment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 403, 406 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 
2011); R.A. Duff & David Garland, Introduction: Thinking about Punishment, 
in A READER ON PUNISHMENT 1, 7 (R.A. Duff & David Garland eds., 1994); 
John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4-5 (1955).  Some 
opponents of retributivism include: Russell Christopher, Deterring 
Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843 
(2002); Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM.  L. REV. 17 
(2003); Russ Shafer-Landau, The Failure of Retributivism, 82 PHIL. STUD. 289 
(1996); Brian Slattery, The Myth of Retributive Justice, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND 
ITS CRITICS 27 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992); Mark Thornton, Against 
Retributivism, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra, at 83; James Q. 
Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85 (2003). 
11
 See GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 414 (2000); MOORE, 
supra note 10, at 91; Dolinko, supra note 10, at 405-06; Duff & Garland, supra 
note 10, at 8.  For critiques of both retributivism and consequentialism, see 
BOONIN, supra note 4, at 37-154. 
12
 See BOONIN, supra note 4, at 183; R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, 
COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY xvii, xviii-xix (2001); DOUGLAS HUSAK, 
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 93-94 (2008); 
MOORE, supra note 10, at 84-85; ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE 
CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 48-49 (1976); Duff & Garland, supra note 10, at 8; 
Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in A READER ON 
PUNISHMENT, supra note 10, at 73, 74; Jean Hampton, The Moral Education 
Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208, 212 (1984); Robert F. Schopp, 
Mental Illness, Police Power Interventions, and the Expressive Functions of 
Punishment, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 99, 109-13; 
Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Proportionality, in A READER ON 
PUNISHMENT, supra note 10, at 118-27.  For critiques of expressivism, see 
HUSAK, supra, at 88; Dolinko, supra note 10, at 417-20; D.B. Hershenov, 
Restitution and Revenge, 96 J. PHIL. 79, 85-86 (1999).  For a very helpful 
summary of consequentialism, retributivism, and expressivism and potential 
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Every infliction of criminal punishment expresses three points:  (a) the 
subject of punishment committed wrongdoing; (b) the subject is at least 
criminally, if not morally, responsible for this wrongdoing; and (c) the 
subject should be condemned for her criminal behavior.  It may plausibly 
be argued that expressivism ultimately reduces to a combination of the 
two main theories in play – retributivism (giving criminals their just 
deserts) and consequentialism (for educative effect).
13
  But whether or 
not this reductive hypothesis is true, the virtue of expressivism is that it 
captures moral censure and stigmatization, two essential components of 
criminal punishment.
14
 
 Regarding retributivism, the central topic of this Article, I will 
argue that it is only partly correct.  While retributivism helps both to 
explain and to justify criminal punishment, it cannot completely fulfill 
both of these tasks – explanation and justification – on its own.  Instead, 
it must be supplemented by what is usually considered to be its principal 
competitor
15
 – again, consequentialism.  In this way, my paper is 
ultimately a plea for rapprochement.  The war between retributivism and 
consequentialism has gone on long enough.  This Article will attempt to 
hammer out the terms of a lasting peace treaty.
16
 
                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
problems with each, see DUFF, supra, at 3-34.  For a list of purposes that do not 
fall cleanly into any one of these three categories (retributivism, 
consequentialism, or expressivism), see FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE,  THE 
GENEALOGY OF MORALS 80-81 (Walter Kaufmann tr. 1989 [1887]). 
13
 See Dolinko, supra note 10, at 421; Hampton, supra note 12, at 212-13; Jean 
Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS 
CRITICS, supra note 10, at 1, 13, 14 (1992); Eric Jaffe, The Complicated 
Psychology of Revenge, OBSERVER, Oct. 2011, 
http://www.psychologicalscience.org/index.php/publications/observer/2011/octo
ber-11/the-complicated-psychology-of-revenge.html; J.L. Mackie, Morality and 
the Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 4-5 (1982).  
14
 See HUSAK , supra note 12, at 93; Douglas Husak, The De Minimis 
“Defence” to Criminal Liability, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 328, 349-50 (R.A. Duff & Stuart Green eds., 2011). 
15
 See generally DUFF, supra note 12, at 3; Christopher, supra note 10, at 855-
65; Dolinko, supra note 10, at 408-09. 
16
 Many courts and scholars have advocated “mixed” or “hybrid” theories of 
punishment.  See, e.g., Tapia v. U.S., 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (2011); DUFF, supra 
note 12, at xvii; FLETCHER, supra note 11, at 418; H.L.A.  HART, PUNISHMENT 
AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 9 (2008 (2d ed.)); 
HUSAK, supra note 12, at 203-05; MOORE, supra note 10, at 92-94; VON HIRSCH, 
supra note 6, at 49-55; Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution: The Central Aim of 
Punishment, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 19, 30-31 (2003); Douglas Husak, 
Why Punish the Deserving? 26 NOÛS 447, 452 (1992) [hereinafter Husak, Why 
Punish]; Douglas Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
959, 971-77 (2000) [hereinafter Husak, Retribution]; Dan Markel, Against 
Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1442-43 (2004); Alice Ristroph, Desert, 
Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1298 
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 The war between consequentialism and retributivism has been 
fueled by three kinds of mischievous thought-experiments, hypotheticals 
in which highly unusual conditions are stipulated in such a way that the 
two theories’ different goals – backward-looking just deserts and 
forward-looking good consequences – end up opposing each other:  (a) 
bad consequences result  from punishing criminals,
17
 (b) good 
consequences result from punishing innocent individuals,
18
 and (c) good 
                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
(2006).  But see MOORE, supra note 10, at 94, 97-102 (arguing that mixed 
theories fail because retributivism does all the work and consequentialism either 
interferes with this work or gratuitously free-rides on it); Christopher, supra note 
10, at 869 (“The difficulty for most mixed theories is that either substantive 
issues of justification are assumed away by definition or the instability of the 
components leads to a collapse back into consequentialism.  While [H.L.A.] 
Hart’s mixed theory may avoid those problems, its own difficulty is in setting 
the amount of punishment.”) (citations omitted); Donald Dripps, Fundamental 
Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology of Blame, 56 
VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1390-91 (2003) (“The comforting consistency of utilitarian 
and retributive theories with respect to most practical issues may be a cognitive 
illusion.”).  For a survey and critique of different mixed theories, see Dolinko, 
supra note 10, at 421-27.   
17
 Punishment “abolitionists” – people who believe that criminal punishment 
does (much) more harm than good – rely on these kinds of examples.  
Abolitionists include:  BOONIN, supra note 4, at 213-75; H. Bianchi, Abolition: 
Assensus and Sanctuary, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT, supra note 10, at 336, 
336-39; Eugene E. Dais, Commentary: Positive Retributivism and Despicable 
Justice, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 10, at 107; see also 
Husak, Why Punish, supra note 16, at 448-49 (arguing that, in several different 
kinds of situations, an offender should not be punished even though he deserves 
it because the consequences of punishing him would be too costly); Husak, 
Retribution, supra note 16, at 975-76 (“Retributivists . . . seemingly suppose that 
their task is complete when they show that the punishment of culpable 
wrongdoers is intrinsically good . . . But this demonstration does not suffice to 
justify the institution of punishment – even for retributivists. They must show 
not only that giving culpable wrongdoers what they deserve is intrinsically 
valuable, but also that it is sufficiently valuable to offset the drawbacks that 
inevitably result when an institution of punishment is created. . . . My point is 
that the value of realizing retributive justice, by itself, is insufficient to justify 
the creation of an institution of punishment with [several] formidable 
drawbacks.”) (citations omitted). 
18
 See J.J.C. SMART, An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics, in 
UTILITARIANISM FOR AND AGAINST 69-72 (J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD 
WILLIAMS, 1973); Rawls, supra note 10, at 9-13; MOORE, supra note 10, at 93 
n.19, 94-97; WILFRID J. WALUCHOW, THE DIMENSIONS OF ETHICS:  AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ETHICAL THEORY 166-68 (2003); Hampton, supra note 12, at 
214; Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and 
Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 118 (2000); Christopher, 
supra note 10, at 870-80, 922-23. 
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consequences result from not punishing criminals.
19
  The idea behind all 
three thought-experiments is to show that consequentialism (good 
consequences) and retributivism (just deserts) can come into conflict and 
therefore that we must choose one over the other.  It is certainly true that 
these three kinds of situations can drive a wedge between retributivism 
and consequentialism.  As long as two different ethical theories of any 
kind have two different primary goals, there will always be ways to bring 
these goals – and therefore these theories – into conflict.  But the fact 
that retributivism and consequentialism can come into conflict hardly 
shows that they do not usually work together.  On the contrary, that is 
exactly what retributivism and consequentialism do – usually work 
together.  
 In fact, retributivism not only works well with consequentialism; 
it needs consequentialism.  There are three reasons.  In Part III, I will 
provide the first two reasons.  Both of these reasons start from the fact 
that retributivism is as much in need of explanation as the thing that it is 
trying to explain (criminal punishment).  The notion that the state should 
give criminals the punishment that they deserve requires further 
explanation because retributivists do not also believe that the state should 
give good people the praise or rewards that they deserve for their 
virtuous acts.  So why do retributivists think that it is imperative that the 
state inflict negative desert but not bestow positive desert?  Simply 
stating, as retributivism does, that we should give people their just 
deserts just does not answer this question.  The concept of just deserts is 
neutral between negative and positive desert and therefore fails to 
explain retributivism’s asymmetrical emphasis on negative desert. 
 I will argue that there are two reasons why retributivists believe 
that the state should inflict negative desert rather than guarantee positive 
desert, and both reasons are consequentialist.  The first reason is that 
inflicting negative desert is much more practicable than guaranteeing 
positive desert.  Difficult as the task of law enforcement may be, it is 
much easier to find, arrest, prosecute, convict, and punish them than it 
would be for the state to seek out the much larger number of virtuous 
people and give them the praise and rewards that they deserve.  The 
second reason is what I will refer to as the Motivation Thesis.  The 
Motivation Thesis says that, whether or not retributivists admit it (to 
themselves, no less to others), retributivism is largely motivated by 
vengeance; that retributivists’ desire for retributive justice, for giving 
criminals their just deserts, is itself motivated by the (deeper) desire to 
give criminals a taste of their own medicine, to pay them back for the 
unjustified and unexcused harm that they have caused.
20
 And, as a 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
19
 See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Vol. 
2) 193 (1988 [1781]); see generally MOORE, supra note 10, at 100-01; 
Christopher, supra note 10, at 858 n.66; Dolinko, supra note 10, at 406-07. 
20
 See JEFFRIE MURPHY, Hatred: a qualified defense, in FORGIVENESS AND 
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motivation, vengeance (or the channeling of vengeful feelings, which is 
sometimes euphemized as “victim closure”) is consequentialist, not 
retributivist, because we act on it in order to achieve a good consequence 
– namely, annulling the crime (or turning the crime back on the criminal) 
and thereby achieving a restoration of the moral and social order, which 
itself contributes to the victim’s sense that the criminal’s wrongdoing has 
been at least partly righted.
21
   
 Most retributivists are reluctant to admit that retributive justice is 
motivated by vengeance largely because they fail to realize that 
vengeance can be not only justified but justificatory.
22
  And they fail to 
achieve this realization because vengeance has a bad reputation.
23
  Once 
again, it is generally thought to be just plain wrong, a feeling that should 
not be indulged but rather repudiated in favor of its angelical opposite – 
forgiveness.
24
  So to suggest that vengeance can actually be justified or 
justify criminal punishment will strike many as not only misguided but 
                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
MERCY 95 (JEFFRIE MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, 1988); Leo Zaibert, 
Punishment and Revenge, 25 L. & PHIL. 81, 115 (2006). 
21
 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010); CHARLES K.B. BARTON, 
GETTING EVEN: REVENGE AS A FORM OF JUSTICE 10 (1999); GEORGE FLETCHER, 
BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 37-38 (1998); JEAN HAMPTON, The 
Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 20, at 111, 125, 130-
31; MURPHY, supra note 14, at 89; Theodore M. Benditt, Revenge, 38 THE PHIL. 
F. 357, 358, 362 (2007); Bradley, supra note 16, at 29-30; Alan Brudner, In 
Defence of Retributivism, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 10, at 
93 passim; Dolinko, supra note 10, at 416-17; John Finnis, Retribution: 
Punishment’s Formative Aim, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 91, 97, 103 (1999); George 
Fletcher, What Is Punishment Imposed For? 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 101, 
104, 109 (1994); Hershenov, supra note 12, at 80, 87-88; Matthew Jones, 
Overcoming the Myth of Free Will in Criminal Law: The True Impact of the 
Genetic Revolution, 52 DUKE L.J. 1031, 1045, 1048-49 (2003); Markel, supra 
note 16, at 1446-47. 
22
 See BOONIN, supra note 4, at 152; Mackie, supra note 13, at 3; Rosebury, 
supra note 8, at 11. 
23
 See BARTON, supra note 21, at xiv, 1-2, 9; PETER A FRENCH, THE VIRTUES OF 
VENGEANCE x (2001); MURPHY, supra note 14, at 90; Rosebury, supra note 8, at 
20.  But see ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: WHY WE ARE THE WAY 
WE ARE: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 339 (1994) 
(suggesting that the “impulse of retribution” is surrounded by an “aura of 
reverence” and is imbued with “the ethereal sense that [it] embodies some 
higher ethical truth”). 
24
 See BARTON, supra note 21, at 2; MICHAEL E. MCCULLOUGH, BEYOND 
REVENGE:  THE EVOLUTION OF THE FORGIVENESS INSTINCT xix (2008); JEFFRIE 
MURPHY, Introduction, The retributive emotions, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, 
supra note 20, at 1, 4; David M. Lerman, Forgiveness in the Criminal Justice 
System: If It Belongs, Then Why Is It So Hard to Find?  27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1663, 1663-64, 1666-67 (2000). 
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also wicked and pathological.
25
  Still, this perception is wrong.  We 
retributivists need to do better damage control.  We should no longer be 
reluctant to articulate our theory of criminal punishment in terms of 
vengeance.  In Part IV, then, I will supplement the Motivation Thesis 
with what I call the Justification Thesis.  The Justification Thesis says 
that the desire to exact revenge against criminals for the harm that they 
cause is not an unfortunate, irrational disposition lodged deep in our 
psyches but rather both a morally appropriate reaction and a perfectly 
decent and honorable motivation for criminal punishment.
26
 
 Finally, in Part VI, I will present the last of the three reasons 
why retributivism needs consequentialism:  retributivism does a better 
job of explaining and justifying criminal punishment for harmful crimes 
than for harmless (or victimless) crimes such as drug possession, 
resisting arrest, insider trading, and counterfeiting.
27
  While it is true that 
retributivists believe that people who commit crimes, harmful or 
harmless, should be punished, the primary explanation and justification 
of the infliction of criminal punishment for harmless crimes is 
consequentialism.  Retributivism plays a much smaller role. 
 
II. The Main Goals of the Criminal Justice System 
 
The three primary goals of the criminal justice system are to give 
criminals the punishment that they deserve,
28
 minimize crime,
29
 and 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
25
 See BARTON, supra note 21, at xiv. 
26
 Since the late 1980s and especially in the last fifteen years, some scholars are 
finally admitting this point:  BARTON, supra note 21, at xv, 30; MOORE, supra 
note 10, at 117-18, 141-44; MURPHY, supra note 14, at 90; STEVEN PINKER, THE 
BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 532 (2011); 
WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 339; Hershenov, supra note 12, at 90.  Even the 
United States Supreme Court accepts this point.  See Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2028; 
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 359 (2007). 
27
 As I will briefly argue in Part VI, the classic inchoate crimes – attempt, 
conspiracy, and solicitation – often inflict psychological harm even when they 
do not inflict physical harm.  In support of this point, see R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL 
ATTEMPTS 130 (1996); Anthony M. Dillof, Modal Retributivism: A Theory of 
Sanctions for Attempts and Other Criminal Wrongs, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 
662 (2011); Susan Hanley Duncan, Myspace Is Also Their Space: Ideas for 
Keeping Children Safe From Sexual Predators on Social-Networking Sites, 96 
KY. L.J. 527, 542 (2007-08); Hershenov, supra note 12, at 87. 
28
 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
29
 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  Many criminal scholars suggest 
that the primary purpose of the criminal justice system is crime prevention.  See, 
e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN (WITH STEPHEN 
MORSE). CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 3 (2009); 
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION: A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS 30-31 
(2006).  But prevention, which connotes success, is less accurate a term than 
deterrence or minimization for the simple reason that, in spite of the existence of 
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thereby express serious moral condemnation of criminals for their 
criminal acts.
30
  There is no need to decide which of the first two goals is 
more important.  It is perfectly acceptable to maintain that they are both 
equally important, at least when it comes to punishing harmful (as 
opposed to harmless) crimes.  As I mentioned in the Introduction, one of 
the central points of this Article is to end the unnecessary war between 
these two positions and recognize that they generally work beautifully 
together. 
 
A.  The First Primary Goal of the Criminal Justice System:  Crime 
Minimization 
 
Regarding the first goal, why do we want to minimize crime in 
the first place?  In a previous paper, I offered this answer: 
 
The criminal law is largely concerned with protecting people 
against deliberately inflicted harm to their supremely valued 
interests, to the interests that they generally most highly 
value—namely life, physical well-being, emotional well-being, 
family, liberty, and property.  That is why we have criminal 
laws against homicide, manslaughter, rape, assault, battery, 
kidnapping, unlawful imprisonment, and theft.
31
  
 
Of course, there are other criminal offenses that do not necessarily harm 
the supremely valued interests listed above – for example, reckless 
endangerment, solicitation, conspiracy, and attempt.  But what justifies 
legislatures in defining these acts as crimes is the same kind of goal:  
protecting our supremely valued interests against acts that not only do 
damage to our supremely valued interests but also tend or threaten to 
damage one or more of our supremely valued interests.
32
  For the same 
reason, public order or tranquility should not be included in the list of 
supremely valued interests.  Instead, it should be included in another list, 
the list of lesser or secondarily valued interests.  Its inferior status 
explains why such victimless crimes as disturbing the peace (or 
                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
a criminal justice system, crime still occurs. 
30
 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
31
 Ken Levy, The Solution to the Real Blackmail Paradox: The Common Link 
Between Blackmail and Other Criminal Threats, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 1065 
(2007). When protected by the state, these supremely valued interests are called 
rights.   
32
 See DUFF, supra note 27, at 134-35; HART, supra note 16, at 6; see also 
Bradley, supra note 16, at 25-26 (offering a slightly different account).  Because 
some crimes are harmless and do not tend to cause harm – for example, drug 
possession, resisting arrest, insider trading, and counterfeiting – their 
criminalization warrants a different justification.  These kinds of crimes will be 
addressed more fully below in Part VI. 
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disorderly conduct), vagrancy, and public drunkenness are misdemeanors 
rather than felonies. 
 So minimizing injury to our supremely (or secondarily) valued 
interests is one of the two primary goals of the criminal justice system.  
We established such a system (way back when) and maintain it largely to 
discourage as many people as possible from committing crimes.
33
  But 
how exactly do we go about doing this discouraging and minimizing?  
The first thing we do is threaten the public with criminal punishment.  
The (just) state tells the public what kinds of acts are legally forbidden 
and what level of criminal punishment they may expect to suffer if they 
still perform any of these forbidden acts and are caught.  It defines what 
it considers to be supreme-value-threatening and supreme-value-
damaging acts (including omissions and possession) as criminal offenses 
and threatens criminal punishment for their performance.  It does all of 
this defining and threatening with the goal of deterring as many people as 
possible from performing these supreme-value-hostile acts and thereby 
minimizing (human-caused) threats to individuals’ enjoyment of their 
supremely valued interests.
34
 
 Unfortunately, however, no criminal justice system can fully 
eliminate crime.
35
  In every society, some individuals will simply not be 
deterred by the threat of punishment.  What, then, should the state do 
with these individuals, at least those who are caught?  The answer – and 
the second means of fulfilling the goal of crime minimization (in 
addition to making threats to punish) – is the state’s executing its earlier 
threats to punish these law-breakers.  The state’s actually punishing 
criminals helps to minimize crime in three different ways:  by (a) 
temporarily or permanently preventing such criminals from committing 
further crimes (incapacitation); (b) discouraging these specific 
individuals from committing further crimes and thereby risking further, if 
not worse, punishment (specific deterrence); and (c) discouraging many 
other would-be criminals from committing crimes by showing, through 
the example of these particular criminals, what will likely happen to 
them if they are caught (general deterrence).
36
 
 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
33
 See Husak, Why Punish, supra note 16, at 459-62.  
34
 See VON HIRSCH, supra note 6, at 38; Michael Louis Corrado, Responsibility 
and Control, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 90 (2005); John M. Darley, Kevin M. 
Carlsmith, and Paul H. Robinson, The Ex Ante Function of the Criminal Law, 35 
L. & SOC’Y REV. 165, 165-66 (2001); Hampton, supra note 12, at 210-11; von 
Hirsch, supra note 6, at 122. 
35
 See Stephen Morse, Neither Desert Nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265, 267 
(1999). 
36
 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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B.  The Second Primary Goal of the Criminal Justice System:  
Retribution 
 
Is consequentialism correct that criminal punishment’s 
contributions toward crime minimization are sufficient to justify criminal 
punishment?  The answer might seem to be an obvious yes until we 
really consider just what criminal punishment is:  the intentional 
infliction of hardship, deprivation, or suffering by the state in return for a 
proven violation of its criminal laws.
37
  Hardship, deprivation, or 
suffering is not merely a foreseeable but unintended consequence, as it is 
with (a) civil commitment,
38
 (b) administrative regulations,
39
 and (c) 
medical treatment.
40
  Once again, hardship, deprivation, or suffering is 
intended.
41
 
The same, however, cannot be said of tort remedies.  For this 
reason, they are harder to distinguish from criminal punishment than are 
civil commitment, administrative regulations, and medical treatment.
42
  
                                                     
 
 
 
 
37
 See BOONIN, supra note 4, at 7, 17; DUFF, supra note 12, at  xiv-xv; HART, 
supra note 16, at 4-5; HUSAK, supra note 12, at 92; David Dolinko, Three 
Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1626 (1992); Feinberg, 
supra note 12, at 73; Husak, Why Punish, supra note 16, at 455; Husak, 
Retribution, supra note 16, at 963-64; Richard L. Lippke, No Easy Way Out: 
Dangerous Offenders and Preventive Detention, 27 L. & PHIL. 383, 408 (2008); 
von Hirsch, supra note 12, at 118; Zaibert, supra note 20, at 110; see also 
HAMPTON, supra note 21, at 126 (“I propose that the most general and accurate 
definition of ‘punishment’ is:  the experience of defeat at the hands of the victim 
(either directly or indirectly through a legal authority).”); Dolinko, supra note 
10, at 404-05 (critiquing Hart’s definition). 
38
 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-64, 368-69 (1997); Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-539 (1979); FLETCHER, supra note 11, at 412-13; 
HART, supra note 16, at 17; HUSAK, supra note 12, at 93. 
39
 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92-106 (2003); Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963); George L. Blum, State Statutes or 
Ordinances Requiring Persons Previously Convicted of Crime to Register with 
Authorities as Applied to Juvenile Offenders—Duty to Register, Requirements 
for Registration, and Procedural Matters, 38 A.L.R.6TH 1, § 31 (Registration 
requirement as nonpunitive) (2013); see also Romualdo P. Eclavea and Lucas 
D. Martin, Sex offender registration statutes, 53 AM. JUR. 2D MENTALLY 
IMPAIRED PERSONS § 126 (2013) (discussing sex-offender registration laws). 
40
 See State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 751-53 (La. 1992); People v. Fuller, 24 
N.Y.2d 292, 302-03 (N.Y. 1969); Jami Floyd, The Administration of 
Psychotropic Drugs to Prisoners: State of the Law and Beyond, 78 CAL. L. REV. 
1243, 1272-78 (1990); E.M. Opton, Psychiatric Violence Against Prisoners: 
When Therapy Is Punishment, 45 MISS. L.J. 605, 608 (1974). 
41
 See BOONIN, supra note 4, at 12-17; HUSAK, supra note 12, at 92. 
42
 See Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the 
Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 783-84 (1997); Aman 
Ahluwalia, Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators: The Search for a 
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Like criminal punishment, tort remedies such as compensatory damages 
and restitution are intended to make defendants suffer a deprivation – 
namely, a deprivation of their money.  But there are still two main 
differences between tort remedies and punishment.  First, tort remedies 
are designed to fulfill two main ends:  (i) deterring defendants and the 
general public from committing the same kind of torts in the future and 
(ii) restoring, as much as possible, the plaintiffs whom the defendants 
previously injured to the condition that they enjoyed prior to injury.
43
  
While criminal punishment also aims to a large extent at deterrence, it 
does not generally aim at victim restoration.
44
  Instead, it intentionally 
inflicts hardship, deprivation, or suffering in order to achieve two other 
ends (in addition to deterrence):  giving the criminal what she deserves 
and expressing condemnation of the criminal for her criminal activity.
45
  
I will defend the former point (about just deserts) in this Part.  Second, 
while criminal punishment may amount to a fine, which superficially 
resembles monetary damages and restitution, criminal punishment is 
often implemented in other ways that tort remedies are not.  These other 
ways include incarceration, shaming, probation, community service, 
license revocations, and loss of civil rights such as the right to vote and 
the right to own firearms. 
 
1.  The Problem of Punishment 
 
Given that the criminal justice system intentionally inflicts 
hardship, deprivation, or suffering, one might very well argue that 
criminal punishment simply cannot be just – no matter how much it 
helps to minimize crime.  On this view, no matter what the person’s 
                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
Limiting Principle, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y, & ETHICS J. 489, 491-92, 503-05 
(2006). 
43
 See Christopher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 329, 355 (2007); Steiker, supra note 42, at 784-85. 
44
 Some scholars, however, advocate shifting the criminal justice system’s focus 
from retributive to restorative justice.  See, e.g., BOONIN, supra note 10, at 213-
75; Bianchi, supra note 17, at 340; Carrie J. Niebur Eisnaugle, An International 
‘Truth Commission’: Utilizing Restorative Justice as an Alternative to 
Retribution, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 209 passim (2003); Lerman, supra 
note 24, at 1664, 1674-75; see also Carol S. Steiker, Tempering or Tampering? 
Mercy and the Administration of Criminal Justice, in FORGIVENESS, MERCY, 
AND CLEMENCY 16, 29-30 (Sarat, Austin and Hussain, Nasser eds., 2007) 
(explicating and briefly critiquing the view that the criminal justice system 
should strive for restorative justice rather than for retributive justice).  Charles 
Barton advocates a restorative approach that includes revenge.  See BARTON, 
supra note 21, at 137. 
45
 See supra notes 10 and 12 and accompanying text.  
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crime, punishment is the morally wrongful response.  This is what David 
Boonin calls the problem of punishment.
46
 
In response to the problem of punishment, one might continue to 
stress the benefits, if not necessity, of crime minimization.  But the 
punishment abolitionist will maintain that no matter how great the social 
utility of an institution, it cannot be morally legitimate if it is 
fundamentally inhumane.  (Consider, for example, slavery.)  And an 
institution such as the criminal justice system that intentionally inflicts 
suffering for the sake of suffering is fundamentally inhumane.
47
 
So in order to refute the punishment abolitionist, it needs to be 
shown that the criminal justice system – in particular, the practice of 
criminal punishment – is not inherently inhumane.  According to 
retributivists, if social utility will not help to demonstrate this point, 
something else will: moral desert.  What justifies criminal punishment – 
intentionally inflicting suffering on criminals – is not merely its 
significant contribution to crime minimization but also the fact that it is 
what criminals deserve in virtue of their criminal wrongdoing.
48
 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
46
 See BOONIN, supra note 10, at 1; see also DUFF, supra note 12, at xi-xii (“To 
ask, ‘What can justify criminal punishment?’—the central question in 
philosophical discussions of punishment – is to ask what can justify practices of 
this kind. . . . The question of justification . . . is . . . a crisis of legitimacy:  for 
when we reflect on the punishments inflicted (in our name) on so many of our 
fellow citizens and on the effects of those punishments on those who suffer 
them, we cannot but raise the question of legitimacy—of what can justify any 
practice of criminal punishment.”); HUSAK, supra note 12, at 92 (“I argue that 
state punishment is hard to justify because it involves two essential features:  
hard treatment and censure.  Under normal circumstances, impositions of hard 
treatment and censure violate important personal interests.  Because ordinary 
utilitarian reasons do not allow the government to infringe these important 
interests, we have reason to countenance a right not to be punished. . . . [T]he 
key to a theory of criminalization is to determine when the state is permitted to 
infringe the right not to be punished.”); id. at 95 (“The criminal sanction is the 
most powerful weapon in the state arsenal; the government can do nothing 
worse to its citizens than to punish them. . . . As a type of response . . . criminal 
sanctions are the most severe and therefore the most in need of justification.”); 
Christopher, supra note 10, at 852 (“[P]unishment does require justification, for 
the same reason we consider conduct violating the core prohibitions of our 
criminal law to be wrong.  Punishment involves the deliberate infliction of pain, 
suffering, and deprivation, which is prima facie wrong.”) (citations omitted); 
Dolinko, supra note 37, at 1626 (“Punishment involves the deliberate imposition 
of suffering on persons convicted of crime; it involves treating these persons in 
ways we ordinarily believe violate human rights (for example, incarceration and 
execution). Why is it morally permissible to do these things (or at least some of 
them) to criminals, when in most other contexts such treatment is morally 
prohibited?”). 
47
 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
48
 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  Doug Husak argues that the task of 
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According to retributivists, then, the state is justified in inflicting 
criminal punishment not because of its presumed good consequences for 
society, as consequentialists claim, and not because of its symbolic 
importance, as expressivists claim, but simply because criminals deserve 
it.
49
  This desert can take two forms: either a “moral debt” that only 
criminal punishment can discharge
50
 or a right to criminal punishment 
that the criminal “earned” through her commission of a crime.51  Both the 
debt view and the rights view of criminal punishment presuppose that the 
criminal is at least criminally, if not morally, responsible for her crime.
52
 
                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
justifying criminal punishment is to show not that it is morally permissible or 
that it is morally obligatory but that it helps “the state more closely [to] 
approximate the ideal of justice, and thus add[] value to the world.”  Husak, Why 
Punish, supra note 16, at 454; see also HUSAK, supra note 12, at 200-01 (“I 
share [Michael] Moore’s judgment that the state of affairs in which [people who 
commit monstrous crimes] receive their just deserts is preferable to the state of 
affairs in which they do not (even though the former may not be intrinsically 
good).  I also concur with Moore about the crucial point that divides 
retributivists from consequentialists:  our judgments about these respective 
states of affairs do not depend on utilitarian gains.”); Husak, Retribution, supra 
note 16, at 984-85 (“The only benefit of punishing harmless wrongdoing is that 
so doing makes ‘the world . . . a morally better place.’ But there are many ways 
to improve the world; exacting retributive justice on harmless wrongdoers is 
very low on any sensible list of priorities.”) (citations omitted). 
49
 See BARTON, supra note 21, at 10; BOONIN, supra note 10, at 85; FLETCHER, 
supra note 11, at 415; Dolinko, supra note 37, at 1626; Rawls, supra note 10, at 
5; Mackie, supra note 13, at 4. 
50
 See BOONIN, supra note 10, at 149-52; Bradley, supra note 16, at 20; Finnis, 
supra note 21, at 99; Hershenov, supra note 12, at 86-94; Herbert Morris, 
Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475, 483 (1968); Ristroph, supra note 
16, at 1301.  But see Mackie, supra note 13, at 5 (“It is often suggested that by 
being punished, a criminal pays a debt to society.  But how can this be, unless 
what he suffers does some good to society?  Reparation might be justified in this 
way, but reparations are clearly different from punishments . . .”). 
51
 See BARTON, supra note 21, at 5; MOORE, supra note 10, at 150-51; 
Christopher, supra note 10, at 864 n.113; Dais, supra note 17, at 112; Dolinko, 
supra note 37, at 1642; Hershenov, supra note 12, at 79, 91-92; Morris, supra 
note 50, at 485-86; Jeffrie Murphy, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on 
Psychopathy, 82 ETHICS 284, 291-92 (1972); Christopher Slobogin, A 
Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5, 30-31 (2003). 
52
 See Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice and Public Trials by Jury: 
Sixth Amendment Applications in a Post-McKeiver World, 91 NEB. L. REV. 1, 19 
n.68 (2012); John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV.1329, 1333 (2009); Dan M. 
Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 
96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 340 (1996); Ken Levy, Dangerous Psychopaths: 
Criminally Responsible But Not Morally Responsible, Subject To Criminal 
Punishment And To Preventive Detention, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1299, 1345, 
1363 (2011); von Hirsch, supra note 12, at 121. 
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2.  Proportionality 
 
 There are two kinds of retributivism:  weak and strong.
53
  Weak 
retributivism says that just deserts is a necessary condition of criminal 
punishment, that criminal punishment cannot be just unless the person 
punished committed criminal wrongdoing and is being punished for that 
wrongdoing. Strong retributivism says that just deserts (criminal 
wrongdoing) is a sufficient condition of criminal punishment.
54
  While 
weak retributivism is accepted by all but a few radical consequentialists 
who believe that it is sometimes (or even often) morally permissible to 
knowingly punish an innocent person,
55
 strong retributivism is much 
more controversial.  There are at least two objections against it, two 
arguments that mere just deserts is not a sufficient condition for just 
punishment.  First, other conditions – especially due process and all the 
conditions that due process entails – are necessary.56  Second, there are 
situations in which a person committed a crime and is afforded due 
process but still does not deserve punishment, at least by the state.  These 
include situations in which the person committed the crime with a 
recognized excuse or justification, the person has already been punished 
proportionately by non-state actors,
57
 the person deserves forgiveness or 
mercy,
58
 or the crime is de minimis.
59
 
 Given the minimality of weak retributivism and the two 
problems with strong retributivism, I suggest that retributivists adopt a 
“middle-of-the-road option” – moderate retributivism.  Moderate 
retributivism says that (a) it is generally a good thing in itself (not 
because of any expected consequences) if a person receives her just 
deserts and  therefore that (b) if a person commits a crime, then it is 
generally a good thing in itself if, after receiving due process, she 
receives proportional punishment for this crime. 
 Regarding (b), proportionality is built in to (moderate) 
retributivism.  Once again, retributivism is all about just deserts, and just-
ness – or justice – implies proportionality.60  It is clearly not just but 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
53
 See MOORE, supra note 10, at 88-89, 153-154; Shawn J. Bayern. The 
Significance of Private Burdens and Lost Benefits for a Fair-Play Analysis of 
Punishment, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV.1, 3 (2009); Duff & Garland, supra note 10, 
at 7; Mackie, supra note 13, at 4. 
54
 See MOORE, supra note 10, at 83, 88, 91, 92, 104-105, 153-154, 173, 180. 
55
 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
56
 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“. . . nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .”). 
57
 See HUSAK, supra note 12, at 201-02; Husak, Retribution, supra note 16, at 
972-73; Zaibert, supra note 20, at 100. 
58
 See discussion infra Part V C.  
59
 See Husak, supra note 14, at 350. 
60
 See Rawls, supra note 10, at 4-5; von Hirsch, supra note 12, at 115. 
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unjust deserts – an injustice to the offender – if she is punished (far) 
more than her crime merits.
61
  So a person who receives 25 years in 
prison for stealing a $10 item may legitimately claim that her punishment 
does not “fit the crime”; that – given the interests, values, and rights that 
her crime tends to impair and the actual harm suffered by the victim – 
her crime merits much less punishment.
62
  It is also clearly unjust – an 
injustice to the victim – if the offender is punished far less than her crime 
merits.
63
  So a defendant who is sentenced to only 30 days in jail for a 
violent rape is not “paying” nearly what he “owes.” 
 In addition to justice itself, there are a consequentialist reason 
and an expressivist reason for proportionality as well. Regarding the 
former, disproportionate punishment erodes enforcement of, and respect 
for, the law.
64
  To consider an extreme example, suppose that parking 
tickets were punished by life in prison without parole.
65
  At first, it might 
seem that this kind of law would fully eliminate all illegal parking.  And 
maybe it would – initially.  But sooner or later, the conscience of the 
community would step in and thwart enforcement of this law.  The 
public would stop reporting parking offenses, police would stop writing 
parking tickets, prosecutors would stop trying recipients of these tickets, 
and judges and juries would stop convicting parking-ticket defendants – 
all of them out of fear of helping contribute to grave injustice.  
Conversely, if serious crimes were under-punished – for example, the 
statutory sentence for murder were reduced from a maximum of life in 
prison to a maximum of one year in prison – judges and juries would 
routinely nullify the statutory limit and recommend far greater sentences. 
 The expressivist reason for proportional punishment is simple:  
to convey both to the criminal and to the community just how bad (or 
grave or serious) her crime was.
66
  In general, the “message” conveyed 
by harsher punishment is that the crime was worse than crimes that 
receive lesser punishment.  Still, it is important to realize that this near-
platitude oversimplifies the situation. 
 Most crimes prescribe a range of punishment, a range that allows 
for judicial discretion.  Three factors determine the statutory ranges:  (i) 
the relative importance of the interests, values, or rights that the crime 
opposes or impairs; (ii) the punishment that other crimes receive; and 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
61
 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991). 
62
 I leave aside the objection that she does deserve life in prison if this is her 
third felony in a “three-strikes” jurisdiction because this is a different issue.  See 
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003).    
63
 See MOORE, supra note 10, at 98-102; von Hirsch, supra note 12, at 125. 
64
 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. 
REV. 453, 477-78 (1997); Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. 
L. REV. 2385, 2450-51 (1997).  
65
 See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288 (1980) (J. Powell dissenting).  
66
 See Hampton, supra note 13, at 13; Schopp, supra note 12, at 110; von 
Hirsch, supra note 12, at 125. 
  
19 
 
(iii) the relative “rankings” of these crimes (for example, murder is 
considered to be worse than burglary and burglary worse than criminal 
trespass).  So, in any given jurisdiction, the range of punishment for 
murder is going to be harsher than the ranges of punishment for 
attempted murder, rape, and burglary because, unlike these three other 
crimes, murder violates the most important interest, value, and right we 
have – life. 
 Once the range of punishment has been specified by statute, a 
judge will determine how much punishment within that range a particular 
criminal receives.  But what determines the particular punishment that 
the judge picks within this range?   The degree of punishment that a 
judge considers to be proportional to a given criminal act (within the 
statutory range) will depend on three main factors:  (a) the magnitude of 
harm, if any, caused by the criminal act (for example, a $100 theft as 
opposed to a $5000 theft); (b) various characteristics of the offender (her 
age, mental condition, history, and reason(s) for committing the criminal 
act); and (c) any mitigating, exculpatory, or justifying circumstances.
67
 
 The upshot of all this is that proportional punishment only 
partially communicates the gravity of the crime being punished.  
Statutory ranges, which are determined entirely by the community’s 
(legislature’s) estimation of the gravity of the crime in the abstract, are 
only the starting point, not the end point.  For example, in the abstract, 
we regard rape as a much worse crime than armed robbery.  But given 
the other factors that go in to determining proportional punishment, it 
may very well be that some armed robbers are punished more harshly 
than some rapists – even in the same jurisdiction.  A defendant found 
guilty of armed robbery might be given a harsher sentence (say, 15 
years) than a defendant found guilty of rape (say, 10 years) because two 
different judges, or maybe the same judge in two different cases, picked 
two different points in the different ranges – a lower point in the rape 
range and a higher point in the armed robbery range – on the basis of 
different evaluations of the different harms that each crime caused and 
the different circumstances under which each crime was committed.  
   
III. Two Reasons Why Retributivism Needs Consequentialism 
 
In this Part, I will offer two arguments for the central thesis of this 
Article:  retributivism does not work – that is, does not succeed in 
explaining why we punish – unless we supplement it with 
consequentialism.  In Part VI, I will offer yet a third argument for this 
conclusion. 
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A. Why Do Retributivists Insist on Inflicting Just Negative Deserts? 
 If not for consequentialist reasons like crime minimization, why 
are most people – and all retributivists (by definition) – so concerned that 
criminals receive the punishment that they deserve in the first place?  
Retributivists cannot answer this question merely by responding that the 
state should give everybody, not just criminals, their just deserts.  There 
are two reasons why this response would fail. 
 First, it simply fails to capture a certain psychological 
asymmetry.  We are much more outraged to hear that a criminal suspect 
is acquitted (for example, because of a procedural or evidentiary 
technicality) or under-punished (for example, receives only a few years 
in prison for a heinous crime) than to hear that an exceptionally virtuous 
person was not sufficiently rewarded or praised, whether by the state or 
by anybody else.  In fact, we are not really outraged that the latter did 
not receive the recognition and appreciation that she deserves.  Instead, 
we are – at most – mildly disappointed or sad or sympathetic.  The point 
is that whatever emotion we feel, it is much less negative and intense 
than the emotion (again, outrage) that we feel toward the criminal justice 
system’s comparable failure to give a criminal the punishment that she 
deserves. 
 Second, the notion that we are concerned that criminals receive 
their just deserts because we are concerned that all people receive their 
just deserts is simply not true.  The fact of the matter is that the modern 
state is much more concerned that criminals receive their just – negative 
– deserts than that the exceptionally virtuous receive their just – positive 
– deserts.  It has not set up any system or institution that is designed to 
make sure that the exceptionally virtuous among us receive praise or 
reward.
68
  To be sure, the military honors soldiers who show exceptional 
bravery, and the government – or at least some government officials – 
bestow lavish praise from time to time on various individuals who have 
demonstrated exceptional achievement, generosity, or heroism.  But, 
again, we have no virtue justice system to complement our criminal 
justice system, no state-mandated apparatus designed to make sure that 
the exceptionally virtuous are found and given their just deserts (praise 
and rewards) with the same zeal and solemnity that the criminal among 
us are found and given their just deserts (blame and punishment).
69
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B. The First Consequentialist Explanation:  Practicability 
 Retributivists may respond that it is much more important for the 
state to see to it that criminals receive their just deserts than that the 
virtuous receive their just deserts.  But it is not clear that they can defend 
this point without resorting to non-retributivist – i.e., consequentialist – 
considerations.
70
  As it turns out, the reasons for the state’s asymmetrical 
emphasis on dispensing negative desert over positive desert are all 
consequentialist. 
 First, when it comes to maximizing protection of our supremely 
valued interests, which is (as we saw in Part II) one of the state’s main 
concerns and duties, it is more important that it incentivize compliance 
with the law than the performance of supererogatory deeds.  Second, it is 
much easier to determine when a criminal law has been violated than 
when a given act is extremely virtuous.  The former is, for the most part, 
a question of objective fact; the latter is, for the most part, a matter of 
subjective opinion because it requires two highly subjective judgments – 
one regarding what the standards of virtue are (in the absence of any 
“virtue statutes”) and the other regarding whether or not a given act 
meets these standards.  Third, there are (fortunately) many more 
instances of virtuous activity than there are of criminal activity.  As a 
result, a virtue justice system, especially if it was concerned to treat all 
equally virtuous people equally, would have to be immense – much 
bigger than the taxpayers could afford – to fulfill the monitoring, 
evaluation, and decision demands placed upon it.
71
 
 Again, these are all good explanations of why the state is not 
nearly as concerned to bestow positive desert as well as negative desert.  
But they are not retributivist explanations; they are not non-
consequentialist, desert-based reasons.  By itself, then, retributivism fails 
to explain why the state should be much more concerned to inflict 
negative desert than to bestow positive desert.
72
  So we now have one 
very good reason why retributivism must be supplemented by 
consequentialism. 
 
C. The Second Consequentialist Explanation:  Revenge 
 There is yet a second reason why retributivism should be 
supplemented by consequentialism.  Most people agree that criminals 
should receive their just deserts.  But retributivists go further than merely 
subscribing to this proposition.  They have made this the very 
centerpiece of their theory.  They have assigned a higher status and 
significance to just deserts than they have to any consequentialist 
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desiderata (such as deterrence).  The question is:  why?  Why are just 
deserts so important?  Why do retributivists feel so strongly that 
criminals should get what they deserve? 
 Retributivists are likely to answer these questions with a single 
word:  justice.  They want criminals to get their just deserts because they 
want justice – pure and simple.  But the kind of justice retributivists (say 
they) want is not distributive justice, procedural justice, or restorative 
justice.  The kind of justice that retributivists want is – as their label 
suggests – retributive justice.  What, then, is retributive justice?  What 
does retributive justice mean?  It cannot mean simply that criminals 
receive their just deserts.  There are two reasons.  First, this explanation 
would fail to distinguish retributive justice from either distributive justice 
or restorative justice; both of these kinds of justice also involve giving 
people their just deserts.  Second, it would amount to a circular 
explanation.  If retributive justice just meant criminals getting their just 
deserts, then to say that retributivists want criminals to get their just 
deserts because they want justice is just to say that retributivists want 
criminals to get their just deserts because they want criminals to get their 
just deserts.  This is not an explanation; this is an unhelpful tautology. 
 It remains to be explained, then, what retributive justice even 
means (beyond criminals receiving their just deserts) and why 
retributivists want it.  My answer to these questions is that there is 
nothing about the notion of just deserts itself that motivates retributivists.  
In itself, the thesis that criminals should get their just deserts is a mere 
truism, a virtually empty abstraction.  Nor is it merely a brute, 
inexplicable fact that retributivists want criminals to receive their just 
deserts or regard criminals’ receiving their just deserts as an inherent 
good, a positive value in its own right.  The real reason why retributivists 
so passionately adhere to this otherwise unmotivated abstraction is 
because a powerful emotion pushes them toward it:  vengeance.
73
   
 Retributivists – like many, if not most, human beings – 
instinctively wish to return harm for (unjustified and unexcused) harm.
74
  
They – we – feel the urge to hurt another person who has, we feel, 
unjustifiably and inexcusably hurt us.  This desire for revenge is rooted 
in the instinctive desire to maintain our supremely valued interests 
against unjustified and unexcused injury by others.
75
  So when another 
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person frustrates this desire, we naturally react with such negative 
feelings as anger, resentment, indignation, and (sometimes) 
humiliation.
76
  These feelings are not pleasant or comfortable.  Like any 
other kind of emotional suffering, we would prefer to discharge them as 
quickly as possible.
77
  And the most effective short-term way to achieve 
this catharsis, to alleviate or eliminate this emotional distress, is by 
acting upon the urge to injure the perpetrator’s supremely valued 
interests in turn, to show her how it feels.
78
  We feel tremendous 
satisfaction in putting the perpetrator in the same position that she put us 
(the victim).  This turning of the crime against the perpetrator helps to 
restore our sense of emotional equilibrium.
79
  And here’s the rub:  
because achieving this emotional equilibrium, this righteous satisfaction, 
is retributivism’s goal or objective, retributivism – once again – needs 
consequentialism.  Call this proposal that vengeance motivates both 
retributivism and (therefore) criminal punishment the Motivation Thesis. 
 One might immediately object that the Motivation Thesis is just 
wrong, that criminal punishment is not motivated by vengeance any 
more than parental punishment is motivated by vengeance.  When a 
(good) father F punishes his son S – say, for hitting his older sister – F’s 
purpose is not at all to exact revenge against S.  While he may or may 
not be angry with S, a desire to alleviate this anger by hurting S is not 
what motivates F to give S a “time-out” or ground him.  (And if this 
desire does motivate F, then we may seriously call into question his 
parenting and his character.)  Instead, F is motivated by two other 
desires:  (a) the desire to educate S and (b) the desire to reform S.  
Regarding (a), F wishes to teach S – through the “language” of 
punishment – that he should not hit his sister.  Regarding (b), F hopes 
that the punishment will help to deter this kind of behavior – violence 
against others – in the future.  The same, then, can be said of criminal 
punishment.  It is designed solely to educate and reform, not to avenge.
80
  
Put in slightly different terms, criminal punishment, like parental 
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punishment, is motivated solely by consequential concerns, not by 
retributivist concerns; solely by the expected good consequences of 
punishment, not by the gratifying prospect of seeing the guilty party 
finally “get his.”  It is easy to see why this is sometimes referred to as the 
“paternalistic” theory of punishment.81 
 There is something to the paternalist theory.  Certainly, criminal 
punishment for harmless crimes – for example, drug possession, resisting 
arrest, insider trading, and counterfeiting – is similar to parental 
punishment insofar as the sole purposes of both forms of punishment 
(with respect to the punished individual) are to educate and reform, not 
to avenge.  (I will develop this point further in Part VI.)   But criminal 
punishment for harmful crimes differs from parental punishment in at 
least two ways.  First, harmful crimes are generally much more serious 
than most children’s worst wrongdoing.  Of course, if a child commits a 
crime – or an act that would be criminal if she were old enough – then 
parental punishment may not be sufficient; the state may very well need 
to get involved.  But if the child’s anti-social action does not rise to the 
level of a crime (or serious tort), then – by definition – it is not as serious 
(harmful) as even a criminal misdemeanor.  And corresponding to these 
different levels of harm are different attitudes.  While the parent’s 
attitude in punishing the “lower-level” anti-social activity is purely 
consequentialist, the criminal justice system’s attitude – or at least the 
attitude of various people in the criminal justice system (especially the 
prosecutors and the victims) – toward the “higher- level” anti-social 
activity is partly retributivist. 
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 Second, (good) parents stand in a very different relation to their 
children than does the criminal justice system to criminals.
82
  Because 
the former generally love their children, they are much less likely to want 
to see their children hurt for any reason, including avenging the harm 
that they caused.  On the other hand, the criminal justice system – 
especially the prosecutors and the victims – typically do not stand in a 
loving, nurturing relationship with offenders.  On the contrary, victims 
often bear nothing but anger and resentment toward criminals.  And 
prosecutors generally attempt to represent and vindicate these attitudes.  
To be sure, there are situations when victims do stand in a loving 
relationship with their assailants.   Perhaps the best example is domestic 
violence.
83
  Victims of domestic violence are much more likely than 
most other kinds of victims to forgive perpetrators, blame themselves or 
the police, and withdraw their complaints.
84
  But this kind of situation is 
the exception, not the rule.  In the vast majority of cases, cases in which 
there is no loving relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, 
forgiveness, self-blame, and withdrawal of complaints are much less 
likely than anger, resentment, and a vengeful desire to see the perpetrator 
“get his” for what he did. 
 
D. Why Revenge Is Not Irrational 
 One might argue that revenge is nonsensical or irrational 
because it tries to do what is impossible – namely, annul or undo the 
harm that the criminal inflicted by turning the same kind or degree of 
harm back on the criminal.
85
  This annulling or undoing is impossible 
because the past simply cannot be undone.
86
  Even if the victim makes a 
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full recovery, which is not always the case, she still suffered at least 
some physical, psychological, or economic harm and had to spend at 
least some valuable time and effort recovering from it.
87
  Indeed, the 
objection continues, undoing the crime is impossible even in situations 
where restitution can be made because there is still irreversible moral 
harm, the harm of having one’s rights, humanity, dignity, and autonomy 
violated.
88
  If, for example, a thief steals $5000 from a victim and is later 
caught, the $5000 can, and might very well, be returned to the victim.  
But because the initial violation, the stealing itself and the disrespectful 
attitude that it represents, is in the past, it cannot be undone.  
 To be sure, it does seem rather strange that revenge should ever 
bring about any emotional equilibrium in the first place.  It is strange 
because the emotional equilibrium does not seem to reflect any 
metaphysical equilibrium.  But this appearance is not quite right.  When 
the state punishes a criminal, it is not undoing the crime.  That would be 
establishing metaphysical equilibrium because it would involve changing 
the past, which is impossible.  Rather, the state is reducing the criminal’s 
rights and powers to roughly the same degree that he previously reduced 
the victim’s rights and power when he committed the crime.  While the 
perpetrator indicated through his crime that his rights and interests were 
superior to his victim’s criminal punishment negates that message and 
puts the perpetrator back into his non-superior – equal – position.  By 
restoring the equality between perpetrator and victim, by communicating 
that the perpetrator’s rights and interests are not superior to his victim’s 
rights and interests, criminal punishment helps to restore not 
metaphysical equilibrium but moral and social equilibrium.
89
 
 The emotional equilibrium then follows this restoration of the 
moral and social order.  Given our peculiar moral psychology, the 
victim’s knowledge that the criminal has been put as far below his prior 
baseline as he previously put the victim below her baseline itself helps to 
make her feel better about the entire situation.  So revenge is not 
irrational.  It does not motivate us to try to undo what cannot be undone.  
On the contrary, it very rationally motivates us to try to do the next best 
thing to undoing the harms – namely, undoing the moral and social 
inequality and bad feelings that these harms cause and represent.  At the 
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time that the offender committed the crime, she enriched herself in some 
way – usually emotionally or financially – at the expense of the victim.  
Retaliation in the form of criminal punishment helps to compensate for 
this unjust enrichment by justly enriching the victim – specifically, her 
relative moral and social status and emotional state – at the expense of 
the criminal.
90
 
 
E. Our Peculiar Moral Psychology 
 In the second sentence of the previous paragraph, I attributed our 
vengeful satisfaction at seeing criminals punished to “our peculiar moral 
psychology.”  My point is that our widespread belief in retributive justice 
is very much a reflection of our general moral psychology.  Specifically, 
our desire to achieve retributive justice – just deserts – is not sui generis 
but is itself motivated by a deeper desire, the desire for revenge.
91
  We 
believe that it is (a) just to punish criminals in proportion to the moral 
severity of their crimes and (b) unjust not to punish them or to under-
punish them not because (a) and (b) are self-evident principles or 
because dispensing just deserts is obviously a good end in itself but 
because we are the kind of beings who desire (proportional) revenge in 
response to culpable causation of harm. Without this particular, if not 
peculiar, psychological configuration, retributive justice would not be 
justice in the first place.  This is a point that most retributivists, who tend 
to work entirely within the normative, non-psychological framework of 
just deserts, simply miss. 
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 Of course, we can certainly imagine intelligent beings who react 
to crime – that is, to deliberately inflicted injuries against their supremely 
valued interests – either (a) with the same anger, resentment, etc. but 
without a corresponding urge to retaliate or (b) not with anger, 
resentment, etc. (and therefore not with a corresponding urge to retaliate) 
but rather with sadness, regret, indifference, resignation, or forgiveness.  
Indeed, we need not look to other species, extraterrestrial or earthly, to 
find these non-vengeful beings.  Some of them are human.  People like 
Mother Theresa, Martin Luther King, Jr., Nelson Mandela, and Mahatma 
Gandhi come to mind.
92
  How, then, do we account for this state of 
affairs?  If, as I am suggesting, vengeance is instinctive and therefore 
universal among human beings, why do some, if not many, humans react 
to some crimes with non-vengeful feelings?  
 There are several reasons.  First, to say that vengeance is our 
peculiar instinctive response to victimization is not to say that it cannot 
be overridden by more powerful impulses or emotions that the situation 
may trigger.  Indeed, it is likely that most of us have sexual instincts.  
But this hardly means that every situation – even provocative ones – will 
equally trigger these instincts.  Other forces such as socialization or 
stress may counteract them.  Second, in many situations, people are too 
emotionally distanced from the victims.  Even the most horrific crimes 
rarely move most of us because we do not know the victim, and we have 
(unfortunately) heard about too many other anonymous victims to invest 
our emotions in any particular one of them.
93
  Third, to say that 
vengeance is a powerful human instinct is not to suggest that it is deeply 
rooted in all human beings to the same degree.  Some are more vengeful 
than others.  Fourth, we can unlearn revenge, just as we can unlearn, or at 
least learn to control, most other natural instincts.  And this fact only 
proves rather than refutes the point.  The natural instinct was already 
there; otherwise, there was nothing to be unleashed or controlled in the 
first place. 
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F. Nozick’s Distinctions Between Retribution and Revenge 
 The Motivation Thesis, which (again) says that vengeance 
motivates both retributivism and (therefore) criminal punishment, should 
strike the reader as both trivial and controversial.  It is trivial to the 
extent that the definitions of revenge and criminal punishment are so 
similar.  While criminal punishment is the intentional infliction of harm, 
deprivation, or suffering by the state in return for a proven violation of its 
criminal laws,
94
 revenge is a desire to inflict – or the infliction itself of – 
harm, deprivation, or suffering in return for a perceived wrong or 
injustice.
95
  Given these two definitions, it is hardly surprising to learn 
that the latter (revenge) helps to motivate the former (criminal 
punishment). 
 But the Motivation Thesis is still controversial.  Despite the 
similarity just noted between the definition of criminal punishment and 
the definition of revenge, most – including retributivists – regard revenge 
and criminal punishment with opposite attitudes.  While most believe 
that the institution of criminal punishment is a good thing (in theory if 
not also in practice), they also think that vengeance is simply wrong, 
something “primitive,” “mindless,” “barbaric,” “base,” “animal,” or 
“cruel.”96  They argue that while we may be able to understand victims’ 
– and society’s – vengeful desire to retaliate against criminals, it is still 
wrong for society to act on this feeling.  We should no more act on it 
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than we should act on any other understandable but ignominious motive. 
Given this stark difference in attitudes toward criminal punishment and 
revenge, it seems difficult to maintain that the latter motivates the 
former.   
 Perhaps the most prominent defender of this view is Robert 
Nozick.  Nozick argues that criminal punishment bears a much closer 
relationship to retribution than to revenge.  While these two words are 
often taken to be synonymous, Nozick makes five distinctions between 
them: 
 
1.  Retribution is done for a wrong, while revenge may be done 
for an injury or harm or slight and need not be for a wrong. 
2. Retribution sets an internal limit to the amount of the 
punishment, according to the seriousness of the wrong, 
whereas revenge internally need set no limit to what is 
inflicted. . . . 
3.  Revenge is personal: ‘this is because of what you did to my 
______’ (self, father, group, and so on).  Whereas the agent of 
retribution need have no special or personal tie to the victim of 
the wrong for which he exacts retribution. 
4.  Revenge involves a particular emotional tone, pleasure in 
the suffering of another, while retribution either need involve 
no emotional tone, or involves another one, namely, pleasure at 
justice being done. . . 
5.  There need be no generality in revenge.  Not only is the 
revenger not committed to revenging any similar act done to 
anyone; he is not committed to avenging all done to himself. . . 
. Whereas the imposer of retribution, inflicting deserved 
punishment for a wrong, is committed to (the existence of 
some) general principles (prima facie) mandating punishment 
in other similar circumstances. . . .
97
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If Nozick were correct, then one might very well conclude from 
these distinctions that, contrary to the Motivation Thesis, it is wrong, if 
not conceptually incoherent, to talk about the state’s exacting revenge for 
an offender’s crime.  On this view, only the victim of the crime or her 
allies – i.e., non-state actors – can exact revenge.  What the state exacts 
when it punishes crimes is retribution.
98
 
This Nozickian objection to the Motivation Thesis, however, 
warrants several responses.
99
  First, thus stated, it is merely a semantic 
point.  When the state exacts revenge, we call it one thing (retribution); 
when a private citizen exacts revenge, we call it something else (simply 
revenge).  Even if this semantic point is correct, it fails to rule out my 
substantive point – the Motivation Thesis – which, again, says that 
criminal punishment is generally motivated by vengeance against 
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criminals for their criminal acts.  None of Nozick’s five distinctions 
explicitly rules out this possibility. 
Second, a supporter of Nozick’s distinctions between retribution and 
revenge might argue that they help to show not merely the descriptive 
point that retributive punishment and revenge have different 
characteristics but also the normative point that retributive punishment is 
morally superior to revenge; that while retributive punishment is just, 
revenge is unjust; that while revenge has a base goal or motivation, 
retributive punishment has a much nobler goal or motivation.  But 
Nozick’s distinctions simply do not demonstrate this point.  Nor do they 
show that retributive punishment is motivated by something other than 
vengeance.  Indeed, the very meaning of the word retribution – namely, 
a “requital according to merits or deserts, especially for evil”100 – 
suggests as much.  So it is not at all clear from Nozick’s distinctions how 
retribution is supposed to be morally superior to revenge. 
Third, contrary to Nozick, there are two very good reasons (in 
addition to those I offered in Part III.C) to think that, even though 
criminal punishment is inflicted by the state rather than by private 
citizens, it is still motivated by vengeance.  First, one reason why it is the 
state – never the victim – that prosecutes criminals is because crimes are 
considered to victimize not merely the individual victims themselves but 
all individuals collectively.  The society is victimized by the crime 
insofar as the criminal is breaking its law and thereby implicitly 
denouncing its moral values.
101
  So, even by Nozick’s distinctions above, 
the state is exacting revenge – revenge against the criminal for 
victimizing it. 
The second reason for thinking that criminal punishment is 
motivated by vengeance is that the state is acting in place of the victim.  
It is helping the victim to do what she would ordinarily be powerless to 
do on her own.  It is, in this sense, the victim’s avenging agent, working 
on her behalf to make sure that the person who victimized her gets the 
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punishment that he deserves for victimizing her.  By assuming victims’ 
burden of punishing the criminals who harm them, the state shows that it 
shares and affirms the victim’s motivations, that it also wants revenge for 
violations against its “client.”102 
 
IV. The Justification Thesis 
 
 Despite my responses to Nozick’s five distinctions between 
retribution and revenge in the previous Part, one might argue that this is 
all sophistry, that revenge is obviously just plain wrong and therefore has 
no place in our criminal justice system.  I offer two responses to this 
point.  First, as a psychological matter, retributivists who think that their 
thirst for just deserts is not vengefully motivated may just be in denial.  
Again, they may be thinking that revenge is something bad and therefore 
cannot admit, either publicly or to themselves, to having vengeful 
feelings, at least not in the context of their support for giving criminals 
their just deserts.  Second, if this first point is correct, retributivists need 
not feel this way about revenge in the first place.  This all-too-common 
assumption that revenge is just plain wrong needs to be challenged.  Of 
course, revenge can be ugly.  Below, I will discuss what is undeniable: 
that revenge can be unjustified, misplaced, or excessive.  But revenge 
also has a good side.  The ultimate task of this Part is to bring this good 
side out. 
 Specifically, I will defend what I call the Justification Thesis.  
While the Motivation Thesis says that revenge helps to motivate criminal 
punishment, the Justification Thesis says (even more controversially) 
that revenge helps to justify criminal punishment.  According to the 
Justification Thesis, revenge that is prompted by genuine injustice is a 
very good thing; retributive justice just is righteous vengeance.
103
 I will 
start by showing that the arguments purporting to show that revenge is an 
unmitigated evil are weak.  I will then argue – more positively – that 
revenge is not only morally permissible but also morally justified and 
therefore that the criminal justice system should reflect, as it does, this 
(peculiar) feature of our moral psychology. 
 One thing I should make clear at the outset is that I am not guilty 
of the “naturalistic fallacy.”  That is, I am not reasoning from the way 
things are to the way things ought to be.  I recognize that even if the 
Motivation Thesis is correct, it does not follow that the Justification 
Thesis is also correct; that even if I am correct that vengeance is (a) a 
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natural, instinctive reaction to culpable wrongdoing and therefore (b) 
helps to motivate criminal punishment, it does not follow that vengeance 
is a good or right reaction or that it should help to motivate criminal 
punishment.  In fact, one might argue the very converse:  that while 
vengeance is a natural, instinctive reaction to culpable wrongdoing, it is 
wrong and harmful and therefore we should do whatever we can to resist 
and overcome it.
104
  So the Justification Thesis has not yet been 
demonstrated.  It still requires arguments that are independent of the ones 
that I have made for the Motivation Thesis.  I intend to provide these 
arguments in this section. 
 
A. Arguments against Revenge 
 Those who think that revenge is morally wrong may not simply 
assume this point, especially when others (such as myself) disagree with 
it.
105
  They need to provide an argument for this conclusion.
106
  As it 
turns out, the four main arguments offered against revenge tend to be 
rather weak. 
 First, it is argued that religions repudiate revenge.
107
  For 
example, the Bible (Matthew 5:38) encourages a person who has been hit 
in one cheek to respond not with violence but by turning the other cheek.  
But this argument is not very persuasive.  First, such biblical passages 
amount to undefended assertions, not reasoned arguments.  Second, 
while other biblical passages also repudiate returning an eye for an 
eye,
108
 some of these – and other – biblical passages endorse divine 
vengeance.
109
  Third, not everybody is Christian, no less religious.
110
  
Arguments that are derived from religion or religious texts will fail to 
persuade the vast secular among us. 
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 The second argument against revenge:  revenge is impractical 
because it helps to perpetuate the “cycle of violence.”111 Indeed, banners 
and bumper stickers continue to replicate Mahatma Gandhi’s (or at least 
India’s independence movement’s) maxim, “An eye for an eye makes the 
whole world blind.”  But poignant as this sentiment may be, it is not 
always true.  First, not all revenge involves violence in the first place.  
Second, as an empirical matter, many acts of private revenge – and most 
acts of state-imposed revenge (that is, criminal punishment) – terminate 
the matter; they are not met with further retaliation.
112
 
 The third argument against revenge:  it is often, usually, or 
always for no good reason (unjustified), against the wrong person 
(misplaced), or against the right person to a degree that is 
disproportionate to the severity of that person’s crime (excessive).113  
While revenge certainly can be any of these things, the risk that it will be 
any of these things does not count as an argument against revenge itself.  
It counts only as an argument against “misapplying” revenge; as an 
argument not against revenge per se but against bad revenge – that is, 
revenge that is unjustified, misplaced, or excessive.
114
  And there is no 
good reason to think that all, no less most, revenge is bad.
115
  The proper 
response, then, is not to condemn revenge per se.  It is to condemn 
unjustified, misplaced, or excessive revenge. 
 The fourth argument against revenge: even though tribalism is 
instinctive, it is also wrong and therefore something that should be 
resisted and repudiated rather than encouraged.  Likewise, then, with 
revenge.  My first response to this argument by analogy, however, is that 
it relies entirely on the assumption that both tribalism and revenge are 
instinctive.  And being instinctive is hardly sufficient for being wrong; 
some of our instincts are clearly good or right or moral.
116
  So even if 
tribalism may be wrong, it hardly follows that revenge is also wrong.  
Tribalism may be wrong for reasons that simply do not apply to revenge. 
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 Second, it is certainly true that tribalism and (as I just argued 
above) revenge can be wrong.  But they are not always wrong.  On the 
contrary, there are two reasons to think that they are often right 
(justified).  First, both revenge and tribalism have served us humans well.  
They are expressions of ancient traits that gave us an evolutionary 
advantage. While tribalism reinforced group solidarity, which promoted 
individual survival, revenge helped to enforce primitive rules protecting 
life and property.
117
  Second, like revenge (as I will argue in the next two 
sections), tribalism still has a rightful place in the modern world.  We not 
only tolerate but celebrate people’s loyalty and devotion to family, 
school, community, team, culture, religion, and nation.
118
 
 I conclude that the extant arguments against revenge are weak.  
In stark – and ironic – contrast, the arguments for revenge are strong.  I 
say that this point is ironic because, as I mentioned in the Introduction 
and then again at the beginning of this Part, revenge is normally assumed 
to be bad.  In the next two sections, I will offer two arguments that the 
desire for revenge in response to criminal wrongdoing is indeed justified 
and therefore can itself help to justify criminal punishment. 
 
B. The First Argument for the Justification Thesis 
 Whether or not we admit it, most of us accept and embrace 
revenge in our everyday lives.  We only half-jokingly parrot the well-
known sayings that “revenge is sweet” and a “dish best served cold.”119  
We often say things like “It serves him right!” and “She had it coming!”  
Bumper stickers proudly announce (and warn): “I don’t get mad.  I get 
even.”120  And we spend much of our everyday lives enjoying both 
fictional and non-fictional accounts of karma, payback, the tables being 
turned, settling scores, getting even, and unpleasant people getting theirs 
across widely different contexts.  Examples include a dominating sports 
team’s being crushed; an unfaithful ex-lover’s being cheated on by his or 
her new spouse; a wicked executive’s losing his wealth; an evil regime’s 
being toppled; a ruthless corporation’s going bankrupt; a bully’s getting 
pummeled; and wicked witches being crushed by flying houses and 
melting into lifeless puddles.  Few, if any, of us object to these vengeful 
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satisfactions.  On the contrary, most of us regard them as delicious, 
refreshing, and highly entertaining; the stuff of great gossip, tabloids, 
literature, and movies; and therefore at least morally permissible, if not 
morally desirable.
121
 
 Given our acceptance – or at least cheerful toleration – of 
revenge in everyday life, it is not exactly clear why some still believe 
that it is morally impermissible to consider vengeance as a motivation for 
criminal punishment.  Why do they draw a line between permissible 
revenge and impermissible revenge at the criminal justice system?  Why 
do they think that vengeful attitudes and actions are generally morally 
permissible outside the context of criminal punishment but morally 
impermissible within the context of the criminal justice system?  Indeed, 
if vengefulness toward non-criminals is acceptable in everyday life, then 
vengefulness toward criminals should be all the more acceptable because 
criminals tend to cause more serious harm. 
 In response to the questions raised in the previous paragraph, the 
only two answers to these questions that come to (my) mind do not seem 
terribly convincing.  The first possible answer is that while it is certainly 
morally permissible to enjoy bad people “getting theirs,” it is not morally 
permissible to give bad people “theirs.”  In other words, while a vengeful 
attitude is morally permissible, vengefully motivated actions are not.  
There is, however, no good argument for this position.  Morally 
speaking, if an attitude is justified, an action motivated by that attitude is 
equally justified; conversely, if an action is not justified, then the attitude 
is not justified either. It is not at all clear why we should make 
exceptions to this general rule for vengeance. 
 A second possible reason for thinking that vengeance has no 
place in the criminal justice system is that vengeance is harmless only 
when it is “unofficial”; that our vengeful delight at the misfortune that 
befalls bad but non-criminal individuals is morally permissible only 
because it does not cause any further harm.  Conversely, vengeance does 
become harmful when we act on it in the criminal justice system.  By 
unleashing our vengeance there, significant harm is being done, 
primarily to convicted criminals. 
 In response to this second proposal, as I argued in Part IV.A 
above, revenge is harmful only when it is unjustified, misplaced, or 
excessive.
122
  This is not to say that the criminal justice system does not 
inflict unjustified, misplaced, or excessive vengeance.  Unfortunately, it 
does.  But these mistakes are still much more contained than they would 
be if private – or vigilante – justice were allowed or encouraged.  
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Because the state is a more disinterested, less emotionally involved, party 
than are victims, and because the state has appropriated from victims the 
role of punisher, criminals are generally punished in a more careful, fair, 
humane, and proportional manner than they would be if victims 
themselves were allowed to take matters into their own hands.
123
 
 
C. The Second Argument for the Justification Thesis 
 Feeling angry, resentful, indignant, and therefore vengeful 
toward a blameworthy wrongdoer, especially a perpetrator of a harmful 
crime, is actually morally superior to not having these feelings because 
these feelings are ultimately rooted in sympathy for the victim and 
respect for her humanity.
124
  We are, as Moore suggests, “vicariously 
injured.”125  We feel angry, resentful, etc. at the criminal precisely 
because she harmed the victim, a fellow human being.  At the very least, 
she committed a crime against her victim; this alone constitutes a moral 
harm.  And through this criminal act, she also caused her victim fatal, 
physical, psychological, or economic harm.  Again, if we have moral 
sentiments – namely, respect for the victim as a person, a human being 
whose rights, autonomy, and dignity were violated – we will react with 
anger, resentment, etc.
126
  Because these feelings have moral motivations 
behind them, they are moral reactions.
127
  It follows, then, that not to 
react vengefully – to react with, for example, indifference, amusement, 
(immediate) forgiveness, or even greater sympathy for the perpetrator 
than for the victim – is actually insulting and therefore immoral.128 
 The following hypothetical helps to demonstrate this point.
129
  It 
is a hypothetical of the third kind mentioned in the Introduction:  non-
punishment with good consequences.  Suppose that pharmacologists 
have synthesized a drug that cures pedophilia.  A convicted pedophile 
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need take only one small, tasteless 20 mg tablet of “NoPed” with water 
to immediately and permanently lose all of his illicit sexual desires.  
Moreover, in addition to being 100% effective, NoPed has proven to be 
100% safe.  Nobody who takes it will suffer any temporary or permanent 
side-effects.  For this reason, the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) 
has approved of NoPed as a treatment for convicted pedophiles. 
 Suppose further that 25-year-old “Pedo” has just been convicted 
of soliciting and engaging in sexual acts with a 9-year-old girl 
(“Victim”).  Should Pedo’s sentence be a forced administration of 
NoPed, after which he will be allowed to return to the community?   Or 
even if he takes NoPed, should he still have to spend at least a few years 
in jail to “pay” for his crimes? 
 The proponent of the Justification Thesis – call her the Avenger 
– will clearly opt for the latter.130  She regards Pedo’s moral debt as 
twofold: not only (a) the physical and psychological harm that Pedo 
inflicted upon Victim but also (b) Pedo’s malevolent attitude toward both 
Victim and the law.  Regarding (a), Pedo caused injury to Victim’s 
supremely valued interests, her physical well-being and emotional well-
being.  Regarding (b), Pedo also caused moral harm; he showed 
contempt and indifference not only for Victim but also for the law.  By 
treating Victim, a young girl, as a mere means to his own end, sexual 
pleasure, he made it clear that he simply did not care what society thinks 
is wrong and did not respect Victim as a human being with a right 
against sexual violation.
131
  According to the Avenger, we simply should 
not tolerate this kind of defiance.  On the contrary, we should send our 
own counteractive message right back at Pedo.  We should convey to 
Pedo, with righteous anger, that whatever he may think, society values 
Victim and the law and laments the fact that Pedo broke it, the harm that 
Pedo thereby caused Victim, and the cavalier, indifferent, and selfish 
attitude with which Pedo wreaked all this havoc.  The Avenger further 
maintains that the only way in which society can convey this message 
with sufficient force is through criminal punishment – in this case, 
imprisonment.  It is at this point that the Motivation Thesis (“payback”) 
and expressivism (“teaching him a lesson”) come together.132 
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 In short, then, the Avenger will (correctly) rebel against the 
prospect of Pedo’s victimizing Victim and then suffering no more than a 
forced administration of a tasteless pill for his crime.  Even if we could 
be certain that all convicted pedophiles would be immediately cured by 
NoPed, the Avenger will maintain that they would still need to suffer 
proportional criminal punishment for their pedophiliac acts.  Suffering 
criminal punishment is the only way in which they could pay the moral 
debt that they incurred when (a) they failed to notify the state that they 
are a danger to children, (b) thereby failed to take the best preventative 
measure (i.e., NoPed), and (c) ended up, for their own pleasure, selfishly 
and callously sexually abusing their young victims. 
 Doug Husak suggests that “it is notoriously difficult to explain 
why [our natural psychological reaction of disapproval or censure] is 
widely regarded as” a ‘fitting’ response to criminal behavior.”133  But if 
my account above is correct, then we have an explanation of this 
psychological reaction.  We find disapproval to be a fitting response to 
criminal behavior because (a) criminal behavior either harms or threatens 
to harm what we value most and (b) the offender thereby exhibits 
contempt and disregard for our supremely valued interests.
134
 
 
V. Objections and Replies 
 
 In this Part, I will anticipate and reply to three objections – the 
first two against the Motivation Thesis and the third against the 
Justification Thesis. 
 
A. Objection 1:  Criminal Punishment Is Not Motivated by Collective 
Vengeance 
 
 According to Objection 1, I have contradicted myself.  On the 
one hand, I argued in Part III.E that many members of society do not feel 
much, if any, emotional reaction to particular crimes or criminals.  I said, 
“Even the most horrific crimes rarely move most of us because we do not 
know the victim, and we have (unfortunately) heard about too many 
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other anonymous victims to invest our emotions in any particular one of 
them.”  On the other hand, I also argued in Part III.C that one of the two 
primary goals of the criminal justice system, to give criminals what they 
deserve, is motivated by a desire for revenge against criminals.  These 
two propositions appear to be inconsistent. 
 
Reply to Objection 1: They are not inconsistent.  To see how they are 
consistent, we need to recognize two distinctions.  First, we need to 
distinguish between individuals’ reactions to particular instances of 
criminal wrongdoing and individuals’ attitudes towards criminal 
wrongdoing generally.  A person may feel vengeful toward criminals 
generally without feeling vengeful toward any particular criminal.  Put 
enough of such people together, and we end up with an institution, 
criminal punishment, that is motivated by collective, anti-criminal 
vengeance in a society where most of the individuals do not necessarily 
feel vengeful toward most of the criminals whom they read or hear 
about.
135
  The institution of criminal punishment, then, symbolizes or 
represents the collective vengeance just noted as well as the actual, 
personal vengeance felt by victims, victims’ families, and those members 
of society who do wish to see this or that particular criminal punished.
136
 
 Second, we need to distinguish between active and dormant 
vengeance.  Most of us do not have much, if any, emotional reaction to 
the crimes that we read or hear about because, as suggested above, we do 
not know the victims, no less the perpetrators.  Just as importantly, we 
also believe that the individuals who committed these offenses are more 
or less being taken care of by the police, prosecutors, courts, and prisons.  
But if the criminal justice system were somehow to break down and we 
could no longer be as confident that criminals were being successfully 
pursued, caught, tried, convicted, and punished, many more people 
would likely experience much greater fear, anger, and – yes – vengeance. 
 Consider, for example, neighborhoods in which the police have 
proven either unhelpful or ineffective at reducing such crimes as drug 
distribution and gang violence.  The majority of law-abiding citizens in 
these neighborhoods do not generally regard this criminal activity with 
indifference.  On the contrary, they feel considerable anger – both at the 
criminals for menacing them and at the police for failing to remove this 
menace.  Indeed, once this frustration and anger reaches a critical mass, 
many of these neighborhoods “band together,” fight back, and do their 
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best to remove the menace themselves, without the assistance of law 
enforcement.
137
 
 As the very phrase “fighting back” suggests, these efforts at 
restoring public order are fueled primarily by anger and vengeance.  And 
this anger and vengeance would not be felt in the first place if the law 
were already being effectively enforced.  It follows that this collective 
anger and vengeance is already there, silently motivating the institution 
of criminal punishment.  It is just not consciously felt by many, if not 
most, individuals until this institution fails to operate as usual.  Then 
their – our – “true colors” come out. 
 
B. Objection 2:  Vengeance Is Too Harsh and Hypocritical 
Jeffrie Murphy was perhaps the most prominent and outspoken 
advocate not only for retributivism but also for the Motivation Thesis.
138
  
In 2006, however, Professor Murphy softened his position and referred to 
himself as a “reluctant retributivist.”139  Murphy is now reluctant, as 
opposed to enthusiastic, about retributivism because he agrees with 
Nietzsche that retributivism without reluctance – an unhesitant, 
unwavering, enthusiastic, self-righteous desire to judge and punish – 
tends to reflect an unhealthy soul, a soul that judges others too harshly 
and itself too lightly.
140
  The unhealthy soul does these things because it 
fails to take into account situationism:  the theory that people’s behavior 
is generated immediately by things generally thought to be in their 
control – namely, reasons and character – and ultimately by things that 
are out of their control and therefore a matter of luck: upbringing, 
personality, cultural influences, and environmental circumstances.
141
 
So, on the one hand, the unwavering, enthusiastic, self-righteous 
avenger judges the wrongdoer too harshly because she ignores the factors 
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outside the wrongdoer’s control – the bad luck – that helped lead to her 
wrongdoing.  Because bad luck tends to mitigate or excuse, ignoring this 
element of bad luck in all wrongdoing is not only misguided and 
uncharitable; it is cruel.
142
  On the other hand, the unwavering, 
enthusiastic, self-righteous avenger judges herself too lightly insofar as 
she fails to take into account her own good luck – the fortuitous 
circumstance that all of the factors outside her control did not lead her to 
commit the very same bad acts that she now so eagerly wishes to 
condemn and punish.
143
 
Rather than inferring from situationism that criminal punishment 
is no longer justified, we need to strike a healthy balance between them.  
And this is exactly what Murphy tries to do when he declares himself a 
reluctant retributivist.  He remains a retributivist; to this extent, he still 
endorses blaming and punishing criminals for their criminal acts.  But he 
is reluctant to fully endorse this position because he recognizes that bad 
luck plays a role in every criminal act.  Murphy refers to these two 
positions as the “Two Faces of Retribution.”144 
Given his reluctance, why does Murphy even remain a retributivist 
to begin with?  Why doesn’t he abandon it altogether?  According to 
Murphy, while we must acknowledge the bad luck that lies behind every 
crime, we must still blame and punish the criminal for this crime because 
bad luck does not completely explain why she broke the law.  (When it 
does, the defendant is fully excused; too much bad luck is arguably what 
all the traditionally recognized criminal law excuses – insanity, infancy, 
hypnotism, involuntary intoxication, automatism, duress, necessity, 
mistake (of fact or of law), and entrapment – attempt to capture.)  To the 
extent that bad luck does not play a part in the explanation of a given 
criminal’s behavior – that is, to the extent that this individual knowingly 
and voluntarily broke the law without a good excuse or justification – she 
still does deserve to be convicted, condemned, and punished.
145
 
 
Reply to Objection 2: In a nutshell, Murphy’s point is that while we 
should indeed judge, blame, and punish, we should always keep in mind 
when we do this judging, blaming, and punishing that there but for the 
grace of luck go I.  I fully agree with this (situationist) point.  But 
situationism still leaves as much room for vengeance as it leaves for just 
blame and just punishment.  In fact, it is the same room.  Yes, the 
criminal suffered from some bad luck.  But so did the victim – at the 
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hands of the criminal.  So to the extent that the criminal does indeed 
deserve blame and punishment for knowingly and voluntarily hurting the 
victim – again, a point that Murphy still endorses, however reluctantly – 
the criminal equally deserves the victim’s (and society’s) wrath and 
vengeful desire for retribution. 
 
C. Objection 3:  Forgiveness Is Superior to Revenge 
 According to Objection 3, the Justification Thesis is both false 
and short-sighted.  It is false because forgiveness is morally superior to 
vengeance.  And it is short-sighted because it prioritizes the most 
effective short-term method for discharging the uncomfortable feelings 
of anger, resentment, indignation, and humiliation over the most 
effective long-term method for achieving this same satisfaction – 
namely, by patiently waiting until the “rotten” feelings pass, at which 
point we may feel more inclined to forgive the criminal for her 
transgressions, to accept what she did without any accompanying 
feelings of anger or a desire for retaliation.  This long-term approach is 
preferable for the same reasons that long-term planning is generally 
preferable, all else being equal, to short-term planning:  it generates 
greater overall utility.
146
 As compared with vengeance, forgiveness is 
psychologically healthier, and it does a much better job of promoting 
reconciliation. 
 
Reply to Objection 3: Objection 3 runs into several problems.  First, it 
simply assumes that the opposite of forgiveness – vengeance – is morally 
wrong.  But, as I suggested in Part IV, this assumption is false.  So the 
proponent of forgiveness over vengeance in the context of criminal law 
is not entitled to it. 
 Second, because forgiveness often takes a very long time; 
because most human beings are not that patient; and because many think 
that some crimes are simply unforgivable, they tend to give up earlier in 
the process and opt for the short-term method: vengeance, usually in the 
form of criminal punishment.  So a criminal justice system that generally 
forgave criminals rather than punishing them would seriously frustrate 
the (vengeful) public.  It would, in most cases, fail to achieve the moral, 
social, and emotional equilibrium that only criminal punishment can 
yield.
147
 
 Third, especially for more serious crimes, only the victim, not 
the state, is in a position to forgive the wrongdoer.  It would be arrogant 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
146
 See Ken Levy, On the Rationalist Solution to Gregory Kavka’s Toxin Puzzle, 
90 PAC. PHIL. Q. 267, 277 (2009). 
147
 See KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, CYBELLE FOX, DAVID J. HARDING, JAL MEHTA, 
& WENDY ROTH, RAMPAGE: THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF SCHOOL SHOOTINGS 179-81 
(2004); Hershenov, supra note 12, at 88-89.   
  
45 
 
and insulting for the state to appropriate this prerogative from the victim, 
the one who suffered the brunt of the harm.
148
 
 Fourth, the criminal justice system does not hold us to an 
impossibly high standard.  The criminal justice system does not require 
us all to be saints.  If it did, then most of us would be in jail.  Instead, the 
criminal justice system does just the opposite.  It establishes a floor, not a 
ceiling.  It tells individuals within its jurisdiction the minimum that they 
cannot drop below, not a threshold that they must rise above.  We are all 
free to be jerks; we just cannot be supreme jerks.  That is, we are all free 
to do such morally wrong things as lie to friends, send angry emails, and 
“flip the bird” at other drivers.  We will not go to jail for these acts even 
though they fall below a proper standard of virtue. But we will go to jail 
if we injure or attempt to injure others in much more serious ways – 
ways that fall below a minimum standard of care that we owe everybody 
else.  So even if forgiveness were indeed the morally correct response to 
all transgressions, the criminal justice system simply does not endorse or 
reflect this (supposed) moral truth.  It does not forgive, or recommend 
forgiving, people for committing acts that fall below, or directly 
contradict, the minimum standard of care.
149
  
 Fifth, a policy of forgiveness would lead to a dramatic increase 
in crime because it would signal to all would-be criminals that they could 
now commit crimes with impunity.
150
  For this reason alone, it would be 
very foolish for the state to replace criminal punishment with a policy of 
forgiveness. 
 Still, despite the five arguments above, forgiveness may be 
advisable for the state with respect to some perpetrators in some 
situations.  For example, forgiveness may be appropriate when either the 
crime is relatively trivial (that is, morally negligible and caused little or 
no harm)
151
 or the criminal had an understandable reason for committing 
it.
152
   
 Martha Minow also argues that forgiveness, or at least attitudes 
and practices “between vengeance and forgiveness,” might be 
appropriate for victims of mass atrocities (genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes).  She offers three reasons: (a) there may be so 
many perpetrators that the post-atrocity transitional state simply lacks the 
resources to try and punish all of them; (b) trials, which tend to last 
years, may perpetuate, if not exacerbate, societal divisions, thereby 
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prevent the state from “healing,” and possibly even lead to renewed 
hostilities; and (c) victims and their families will likely be 
psychologically healthier if they can eventually bring themselves to 
forgive rather than let themselves be consumed by insatiable hatred and a 
desire for retaliation that may just never be realized.
153
 
 To be clear, this qualified defense of forgiveness in certain, very 
specific situations should not be confused with a defense of mercy.
154
  
Forgiveness and mercy are distinct in at least two respects.  First, 
forgiveness is an attitude, mercy an act.
155
  Second, those who advocate a 
greater role for mercy in the criminal justice system are not advocating 
that we increasingly forgive criminals.  They still support continuing to 
prosecute and punish criminals.  They argue only that this punishment is 
often excessive; that in our inherently imprecise calculations of just 
deserts, we too often ignore or discount the complex social and 
psychological conditions that cause many people to violate the law.
156
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So to make punishments better fit the crimes, judges, jurors, and 
legislators should develop a greater awareness of, and concern for, these 
mitigating conditions and incorporate this awareness into the sentences 
that they help to prescribe.
157
 
 While some have argued that this “pro-mercy” approach is 
incompatible with retributivism,
158
 the fact that the pro-mercy camp still 
advocates criminal punishment – indeed, fairer criminal punishment – 
suggests that this approach is actually perfectly compatible with 
retributivism.
159
  More importantly for my purposes, it is also perfectly 
compatible with the Justification Thesis.  One can be for both mercy and 
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vengeance.  Mercy is designed merely to prevent the vengeance from 
spinning out of control, not necessarily to extinguish it altogether. 
 
VI. The Third Reason Why Retributivism Needs Consequentialism:  
Harmless Crimes 
 
So far, I have argued that (a) society’s vengeful attitude toward 
criminals who cause serious harm – fatal, physical, psychological, or 
economic – largely explains why we wish to punish criminals (the 
Motivation Thesis); and (b) because vengeance is an appropriate, moral 
reaction to criminals’ injuring people’s supremely valued interests, this 
sentiment also helps to justify criminal punishment (the Justification 
Thesis).  But there are three reasons to think that retributivism cannot by 
itself fully explain and justify criminal punishment.  The first two 
reasons – both consequentialist – were already given in Part III.  Both 
explain why consequentialism does a better job than retributivism of 
accounting for the fact that the state insists on inflicting negative desert 
but not on guaranteeing positive desert.  Once again, the first reason is 
practicability and the second reason is vengeance, the need to channel 
our vengeful impulses through criminal punishment in order to achieve 
moral, social, and emotional equilibrium.  In this Part, I will offer yet a 
third reason for supplementing retributivism with consequentialism:  
only consequentialism, not retributivism, can explain – and therefore 
justify – our punishing certain harmless crimes.  
Harmless crimes – or, more precisely, acts that do not necessarily 
cause harm but are still criminalized – fall into two categories: (a) acts 
that substantially increase the risk of causing serious harm; and (b) acts 
that do not substantially increase the risk of causing serious harm.  
Examples of (a) include the inchoate crimes of attempt, conspiracy, 
solicitation, and reckless endangerment.  Examples of (b) include drug 
possession, resisting arrest, insider trading, and counterfeiting. 
When I say that only consequentialism, not retributivism, can 
explain and justify punishment of harmless crimes, I am referring not to 
(a)-type (risky) harmless crimes but to (b)-type (non-risky) harmless 
crimes.  There are two reasons that retributivism does help to explain and 
justify punishment of risky harmless crimes.  First, once again, risky 
harmless crimes substantially increase the risk of causing serious harm, 
and this increase of risk may itself be considered a harm for which the 
wrongdoer deserves punishment.
160
  Second, inchoate crimes often cause 
psychological harm even when the object of the inchoate crime is not 
achieved.  For example, while the target of an attempted murder might 
feel relieved that she is still alive, she may very well feel very distressed 
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that she came so close to being killed.  Likewise, a child who has been 
solicited for sexual activity might be traumatized merely by the 
solicitation even though no sexual activity actually ensued.
161
 
Non-risky harmless crimes, on the other hand, do present a real 
challenge to retributivism.
162
  Consider, for example, drug possession.  
Suppose Cokie is carrying 10 ounces of cocaine in the passenger seat 
while driving 30 miles per hour over the speed limit.  The police pull 
Cokie over for speeding.  After Cokie rolls down her window, they 
notice the bag of cocaine.  They ask her what it is, she answers honestly, 
and they arrest her for cocaine possession.  Several weeks later, after a 
brief trial, the jury convicts Cokie of cocaine possession.  This seems to 
be the correct result – at least the legally correct result.  Cokie should be 
punished because she culpably committed the crime of cocaine 
possession. 
Once again, retributivism says that that the desire to give a 
criminal her just deserts motivates criminal punishment.  Given this, it 
seems, retributivism cannot explain why Cokie should be punished.  A 
desire to give Cokie her just deserts is not the motivation for punishing 
her.  Cokie’s “act” of possessing cocaine does not motivate punishment 
in the same way that, say, murder or rape does; it does not “scream out” 
for punishment.  More generally, it is not because of anything to do with 
just deserts that we have laws criminalizing the possession of drugs.  
There is nothing intrinsically wrongful – and therefore intrinsically 
deserving of criminal punishment – about possessing any drug.163 
Instead, what is really motivating Cokie’s criminal punishment is 
not the retributivist goal of giving her what she deserves but rather the 
consequentialist goal of minimizing the risk of certain harms. There are 
laws prohibiting possession of cocaine because they are thought to 
contribute toward an overall good consequence – namely, minimization 
of the dangers of cocaine use.  Use of cocaine is dangerous because it 
can lead to, among other things, anxiety, headache, high blood pressure, 
sinusitis, severe depression, violent behavior, loss of consciousness, 
tremors, hyperthermia, kidney failure, stroke, bleeding of the brain, heart 
attack, seizure, suicide, and sudden cardiac death.
164
  So the state has a 
significant (compelling) interest in deterring cocaine use and therefore 
any and all activities that are necessary for, or contribute to, its usage.  
And one such activity (or act) is possession. 
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Still, in response to this objection against retributivism, I argue 
that retributivism still can help, at least to some extent, to explain and 
justify criminal punishment for non-risky harmless crimes like cocaine 
possession.  There are at least two different ways in which it can help to 
provide this explanation and justification.  First, recall (from Part II.B) 
that weak retributivism is the theory that just punishment requires that 
the person being punished both committed wrongdoing and is being 
punished for this wrongdoing.  Responsibility is a necessary condition of 
all just criminal punishment
165
 even if it – or the desire to hold somebody 
responsible – is not the driving motivation for certain kinds of criminal 
punishment.  By weak retributivism, then, Cokie deserves punishment.  It 
is not merely that she wanted to possess cocaine or fantasized about it.  
She actually carried through on this desire, this carrying-through 
violated a constitutional criminal law, and she is criminally responsible 
for this act.  Ex hypothesi, she knowingly and willingly acquired cocaine, 
omitted to dispose of it, and does not have any good excuses or 
justifications for this acquisition and omission. 
Second, in addition to weak retributivism, there is what is called 
“soft” or “limiting” retributivism (and sometimes “side-constrained 
consequentialism”).166  This version of retributivism suggests that (a) 
criminal punishment is justified primarily by consequentialism (the 
benefits that it yields such as specific deterrence and general deterrence) 
and (b) retributivism plays only a secondary role, which is to dictate an 
upper limit on the amount of punishment that may be inflicted for any 
given crime.  Consequentialists who adopt this version of retributivism 
are assuming three things:  (a) the proportionality principle (i.e., 
punishment should fit the crime or at least not be grossly excessive), (b) 
pure consequentialism does not entail proportionality,
167
 and (c) 
retributivism is (therefore) necessary to make sure that the 
proportionality principle is observed.  As I argued in Part II.B.2, 
however, (b) seems false.  Once again, there is at least one good 
consequentialist reason for proportionality:  it contributes to more 
effective enforcement of, and respect for, the law.  And if, as I suggested 
in the Introduction, expressivism is at least partly consequentialist, then 
there is yet another (partly) consequentialist reason for proportionality:  
to communicate both to the criminal and to the community just how bad 
her crime was.  Therefore (c) is false as well.  So the fact that vengeance 
plays no role in motivating (or justifying) criminal punishment for non-
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risky harmless crimes does not mean that proportionality does not apply 
in this context.  It still does – which just goes to show that the 
proportionality principle does not entail the Motivation Thesis, no less 
the Justification Thesis. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
This paper confronts an age-old question:  why do we punish?  
And there are some age-old answers – the two primary ones being to 
give criminals their just deserts and to help minimize future crimes.  
Because these two theories – retributivism and consequentialism – aim at 
two separate goals, they do not necessarily always coincide.  Sometimes 
one goal may be satisfied only at the expense of another.  Scholars have 
exploited this situation to argue for one theory over the other theory – as 
if one theory is correct and the other incorrect.  The fact of the matter is 
that while retributivism and consequentialism certainly can come into 
conflict in very rare situations, they normally do not.  On the contrary, if 
we are to explain justify criminal punishment, the intentional infliction of 
harm, deprivation, or suffering – a state of affairs that is presumptively 
unjustified – we need both retributivism and consequentialism. 
In this Article, I have tried to show just why this is the case.  One 
concept that links the two – however much both consequentialists and 
retributivists repudiate it – is revenge.  The retributivist imperative of 
giving criminals their just deserts – punishment – is itself largely 
motivated by our need to restore the moral and social balance (order) and 
thereby re-establish victims’ emotional equilibrium.  But fulfilling these 
needs – an excellent consequence – is a consequentialist goal.  So 
beneath retributivism lies consequentialism.  They are joined from the 
outset. 
They are also joined at the peripheries of criminal law.  Some 
harmless acts are criminal, and therefore punishable, even though they do 
not arouse our vengeance.  Retributivism, which is fueled by vengeance, 
does not explain and justify this kind of criminal punishment.  It explains 
and justifies only criminal punishment of crimes that arouse vengeance – 
that is, harmful and risky harmless crimes.  We punish all the rest – all of 
the non-risky harmless crimes – strictly for consequentialist reasons.  
Still, just deserts is not entirely irrelevant here.  Just deserts still comes 
into play – not as the motivation or the justification of punishment but 
rather as a means of determining proportional punishment. 
 
